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ABSTRACT 
Writers across a wide range of disciplines within the humanities and 
the social sciences claim that we now live in a postmodern age 
characterised by the demise of the basic tenets of modernism. These 
writers contend that this postmodern age is marked by a profound sense 
of uncertainty. Out of this uncertainty has emerged what many theorists 
view as a radical 'crisis of authority' for the contemporary intellectual. 
Subsequently, a debate has ensued as to whether this 'crisis' has sounded 
. the death knoll for the modern legislative intellectual or has merely led 
to a cosmetic rearrangement of authoritative discourses within the 
academy. This thesis acknowledges that there has been, at the very least, 
a general problematisation of conventional approaches to knowledge. At 
the same time it questions whether this so-called postmodern shift in the 
conceptualisation of knowledge offers an approach conducive to a 
radical politics of emancipation. With these issues in mind, I examine 
the claims of three 'interpretive' or postmodern theorists. I suggest that 
the pluralist affirmation of difference proposed by these writers may 




Whether one agrees that we have entered a new age, a postmodern era 
signifying the fall of modernism, or not, contemporary critics would, I believe, 
generally affirm that the field of representation has undergone a radical change in 
the past two decades. Accompanying this change has been a heated debate about 
whether the so-called 'grand narratives' of modernity, such as the modernist faith in 
the autonomy of the intellectual, still have tenure in contemporary society. In 
particular, there has been a general problematisation within the humanities of the 
modernist claim to a 'sovereign reason' existing outside of the influence of culture. 
By f~regrounding the conventional and constructed nature of narrative, postmodern 
theorists have placed into question the notion that the practice of representation can 
be neutral or transparent. 
This thesis is concerned with the impact that these contemporary critiques have 
had on the role of the intellectual in society. The general scepticism shown towards 
any assertions of authority based upon modernist conceptions of reason and 
rationality seems to render problematic the intellectual's claim of a privileged 
relation to knowledge. Zygmunt Bauman, a prominent sociologist, suggests that we 
are witnessing a dramatic shift within the academy away from the legislative 
concerns of the modem intellectual to a new interpretive and anti-authoritarian 
approach to knowledge. My interest lies in examining the validity of these claims 
and in discussing the possible impact that this so-called 'interpretive tum' might 
have on the politics of representation and issues of difference. 
· I open my thesis with an overview ofBauman's work, using his broad sweeping 
theories about the role of the intellectual in contemporary society in order to set up a 
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framework of analysis through which to view the work of three theorists: Richard 
Rorty, a philosopher; James Clifford, an anthropologist; and Patti Lather, a feminist 
theorist in the area of education. I utilise the critical work of these theorists in order 
to both underscore the validity of Bauman' s claim that the contemporary 
intellectual's status as a privileged possessor of knowledge is indeed under attack 
but, at the same time, to problematise his notion that the legislative intellectual has 
been displaced by an intellectual whose concerns are purely interpretive. 
While for the most part I concur with Bauman's observation that intellectual 
inquiry within the humanities has undergone some dramatic changes over recent 
years, the point of contention for me is whether those changes really represent a 
departure from modernist legislatory concerns. The three theorists that I have 
chosen to focus on all contribute to the claim that the demise of modernist 
metanarratives has been accompanied by a 'dispersal' of authority, and suggest the 
possibility of a more democratic, pluralist approach to knowledge. My aim in this 
thesis is to problematise this assertion. I question the degree to which the radical 
and liberatory claims of the interpretive thinkers I have chosen can be translated into 
a truly non-legislative discourse. 
I think it is important to note at this point that I do not wish to present my work 
as a comprehensive discussion of the concrete problems of authority encountered in 
specific disciplines. I have chosen to focus on theorists who hail from anthropology, 
education and philosophy in order to illustrate the widespread, inter-disciplinary 
nature of issues relating to modem versus postmodern practices of authority. In this 
sense my thesis emerges from a cultural studies, rather than an intra-disciplinary, 
approach in that the orientation of my work is comparative and meta-theoretical. 
Within this cultural studies model my theoretical leanings lie somewhere between a 
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critical, self-reflexive ethnography and the Continental philosophical insights of 
Foucault. This is reflected in the final chapter of my thesis where I briefly discuss 
Rabinow's figure of the Cosmopolitan as a possible model of intellectualism that 
displaces Bauman' s legislative/interpretive dichotomy with a much more fluid 
interplay between pragmatic, local concerns and constraints and a global network of 
power relations. 
I 




Having been trained to live in necessity, we have found ourselves living in 
contingency. And yet, being bound to live in contingency, we can, as Heller 
suggests, make 'an attempt to transform it into our destiny'. One makes 
something a destiny by embracing the fate: by an act of choice and the will to 
remain loyal to the choice made. Abandoning the vocabulary parasitic on the 
hope of ( or determination for) universality, certainty and transparency is the 
first choice to be made; the first step on the road to emancipation. 
Zygmunt Bauman 
Writers across the disciplines, ranging from the arts to the social sciences, 
inform the reader that we now live in a postmodern age. The term postmodernism is 
one that is variously used but often poorly defined. For Ramon Selden ( 19 89) 
postmodernism describes a particular world view characterised by a rejection of the 
basic tenets of modernism and a "profound sense of ontological uncertainty" (p. 72). 
While this all-pervasive sense of anxiety and loss in the face of the death of 
modernity's 'grand narratives' is often seen as reflecting a general cultural 
condition, my interest lies in exploring the utility of the concept of postmodernity as 
a tenn that exemplifies the experience of the intellectual in contemporary society. 
As Zygmunt Bauman (1992) proposes, the concept of postmodernity captures 
particularly well the identity crisis that the intellectual, representing a pivotal social 
category in contemporary society, is currently undergoing. One reason for this 
climate of uncertainty stems from the fact that the cultural realm over which the 
modern intellectual once authoritatively presided is now a contested territory. 
Bauman asserts that there has been a dramatic shift in the way that we construct 
'culture' in contemporary society. While modernity represented an era of certainty 
where the intellectual could confidently call upon universal, Western 'values' in 
order to maintain consistent cultural standards, it seems that in the postmodern era 
the notion of cultural homogeneity has become highly problematic. 
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As the social construction of culture undergoes a radical revision so too the 
epistemological foundations of academic authority have begun to shift. The 
displacement of the traditional model of culture in which knowledge is seen to be 
ordered in a hierarchical and exclusive fashion, by a more democratic conception of 
culture that emphasises diversity and difference, calls into question the legitimacy 
and utility of modernity's so-called grand narratives of rationality and progress in a 
postmodern age. Furthermore, Bauman asserts that the demise of a modernist notion 
of culture relates, in part at least, to the displacement of the integrating role of the 
nation state by a pluralist consumer-oriented society. Thus the combination of an 
apparently radical shift in social structure alongside a growing sense of the 
obsolescence of the fundamental tenets underpinning modern notions of 
epistemology has forced intellectuals to scrutinise their own claims to authority 
within a traditionally hierarchical and disciplinary system of knowledge. 
The central focus of this thesis lies with examining the effects that this 'crisis of 
legitimation' has had on the academy. Like Bauman, I would argue that the 
henneneutic or 'interpretive' direction being taken by many contemporary social 
theorists is a symptom of, and a pragmatic response to, the perceived demise of 
Enlightenment reason as the primary discourse of legitimation within the academy. 
My discussion centres primarily on the work of three theorists: Richard Rorty, a 
philosopher; James Clifford, an anthropologist; and Patti Lather, a feminist theorist 
in the area of education. I have chosen these particular intellectuals because for me 
their writing exemplifies this new interpretive approach to knowledge. I have also 
deliberately chosen to examine theorists from different academic disciplines in order 
to illustrate the widespread and inter-disciplinary nature ofthis henneneutic 'turn' 
and its associated blurring of disciplinary boundaries. 
9 
After highlighting the c01mnon themes that run through the work of these 
contemporary theorists I investigate Bauman's thesis that these new theoretical 
approaches reflect a major break away from authoritarian, monologic approaches to 
knowledge. Here, Bauman' s pivotal concept of ambivalence will be utilised as a 
means of framing my discussion. 1 While the move from structural to discursive 
modes of inquiry that Bauman describes may in part reflect a pragmatic response to 
an increasing awareness of the complexity of the social world, my interest lies also 
in examining this privileging of the interpretative mode within the academy as a 
strategic means of redefining/recapturing an authoritative intellectual voice within 
the c~ltural realm. Where once the modem intellectual perceived the world in terms 
of order and certainty, theorists like Clifford have rejected what they see as 
modernity's futile and questionable search for certainty. Emerging from a 
postmodern experience of uncertainty and instability, these 'interpretive' 
intellectuals have embraced ambivalence not only as an ontology but, more 
importantly, as a radical epistemological strategy. 
A material example of this general shift towards an epistemology of 'fluidity' is 
the recent emergence of cultural studies as a radical, transdisciplinary academic 
arena. The development of cultural studies attests not only to a growing awareness 
of the penneable nature of disciplinary boundaries but also represents an attempt by 
the academy to develop more 'culturally relevant' models of social analysis in terms 
of representing heterogeneity. Sociologists, increasingly aware of the inadequacies 
1 In Modernity and Ambivalence ( 1993 ), Bauman uses the theme of ambivalence in his critique of 
modernity's quest for order. He rallies against the modern pursuit of certainty as an act of 
philosophical violence that results in the suppression of difference. In particular, he argues that the 
Holocaust was an outcome of the modern war against ambivalence and ambiguity rather then the one-
off historical event it is popularly conceived as. He concludes that, as givens of everyday existence, 
we must learn to live with ambivalence and heterogeneity. 
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of rigid structuralist approaches to social analysis, are turning to urban ethnography 
as a means of theorising social complexity. For example, Ulf Hannerz (1992), a 
theorist working in the field of the sociology of culture, attempts to conceptualise 
the "patterns of process in contemporary cultures" (p. 46) in a way that incorporates 
the complexity and ambiguity of present-day cultural flow. Such an approach 
entails moving beyond the rather static language of structuralism to a more fluid 
notion of cultural processes as encompassed within Hannerz's four organisational 
frameworks; forms of life, market, state and movement. While these frameworks 
suggest some degree of structural organisation their boundaries are permeable and 
overlapping indicating Hannerz' s desire to capture the diffuse and decentered nature 
of cultural processes. 
While Hannerz' s work emerges out of a long tradition of symbolic 
interactionism, it also reflects what Nonnan Denzin identifies as a shifting of "the 
focus of interest in interactionist thought toward the terrain of cultural studies" (In 
Dickens, 1994, p. 103). The sociologists-cum-ethnographers emerging out of this 
new theoretical trend towards cultural studies are part of a new breed who are 
concerned with experimentation and hybridisation at the level of knowledge 
systems. As a kind of postmodern avant garde, this group of theorists is driven by a 
desire to transgress rather than construct epistemological boundaries, to celebrate 
fluidity rather than closure. 
This new construction of knowledge along fluid and non-hierarchical lines, as 
represented in the work ofRorty, Clifford and Lather, is, as stated previously, in part 
a response to what Bauman sees as the radical shift in the way we view 'culture' in 
western society. It is important then to examine the nature of this supposed shift as 
a means of contextualising the concerns of these three theorists. Although I take 
issue with the sweeping nature and at times functionalist tendencies ofBauman's 
claims, his meta-theoretical overview of the academy and its relation to dominant 
social and cultural fonns provides a useful frame for my discussion. Accordingly, 
some time will be spent discussing Bauman' s thesis regarding modernity and 
postmodernity, legislation and interpretation before embarking on an analysis and 
overview of the interpretative school of thought. 
The Death of Modern Culture, the Birth of Pluralism 
The ideology of culture, Bauman ( 1992) argues, is a product of modernity. 
11 
Prior to the advent of modernity the notion of culture as an autonomous, man-made 
realm had little relevancy. One of the central premises of modernity then is the 
discovery of a nature/culture dichotomy. Culture, as the privileged tenn within this 
binary opposition, becomes synonymous with a process of humanisation involving 
"the acquisition of knowledge" and the concomitant suppression of natural or 
'instinctive' behaviours (p. 3). 
For Bauman it is no accident that the birth of culture, perceived as a civilising 
process, was accompanied by the rise of the modern intellectual in the early 18th 
century. With the development of a modernist notion of culture wherein "the world 
[ was represented] as consisting of human beings who are what they are taught" (p. 
3 ), the role of the modern intellectual as knowledge shaper and cultural authority 
came into being. Given the modern realisation "that human order is vulnerable, 
contingent and devoid of reliable foundations" (p. xi), it became the role of the 
intellectual to provide a theoretical basis for the rational management of social 
processes. As we will see, according to Bauman, this role tended to draw the 
modem intellectual into complicity with the surveillance and ordering functions of 
the state apparatus. 
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Bauman, following a conventional sociological model of tradition versus 
modernity, asserts that the communal autonomy associated with pre-modem or 
traditional so~iety was eradicated with the rise of a supra-communal, state-based 
fonn of social control where "certainty, orderliness [and] homogeneity became the 
orders of the day" (p. xiv). In contrast with the perceived chaotic primitivism 
associated with the cultural diversity of pre-modem existence, the ambition of the 
modem state was to develop an 'enlightened', collective order guided by external 
stand.ards of reason, rationality and progress. Culture, as an ideological construct in 
modernity, thus became a realm associated with the regulation or civilisation of 
human life. Given this concern with encouraging homogeneity rather than 
difference, anything that escaped this ordering process, that is, "the grey area of 
ambivalence, indetenninacy and undecidability" (p. xvi) was seen to be modernity's 
enemy. 
The nation state's ambition to organise the social world along rationalistic lines 
was accompanied by the emergence of a distinct hierarchy of knowledge whereby 
universalist models of knowledge were privileged over localised, popular or 
pragmatic forms of understanding. In the modernist battle against indetenninacy 
then, the intellectual as the guardian of 'legitimate' knowledge emerged as a 
powerful ally in establishing and authorising the norms and principles of 'rational' 
social organisation and individual conduct. Structuralism, in particular, given its 
central concern with discovering the rules and structures governing social life, 
"translated ... the unifonning ambitions of modernity from a nonnative project into 
the analytic framework for making sense of reality" (p. 54 ). As a school of thought 
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more interested in theories of social reproduction than innovation, structuralism 
naturally emerged out of and contributed to a modernist milieu characterised by a 
faith in certainty. This sense of 'philosophical certainty' was in part underpinned by 
assumptions of cultural superiority as evidenced by the imperialist acts associated 
with the "colonial episode of modernity" (p. 13). 
However as this absolute faith in reason became more and more untenable in 
the face of "the accumulated pressure of adversary evidence" (p. 13-14) the 
confidence placed in Western values diminished. Bauman argues that the deepest 
blow to modem self-confidence, however, stemmed from a growing gap "between 
the i~tellectuals, as collective guardians of societal values, and the modem state" (p. 
14 ). In fact with the development of sophisticated political technologies of 
surveillance and seduction the legitimatory role of the intellectual was rapidly 
becoming obsolete. Meanwhile, as the realm of culture was becoming increasingly 
subsumed within the market sphere, intellectuals found themselves being displaced 
from the role of cultural authority by agents of the market. 
According to Bauman the changing status of the intellectual in today's 
postmodern society has been accompanied by a complete turnaround in the way 
culture is perceived. Where once the modem intellectual sought to tame cultural 
diversity in the name of universal standards, the tendency today is to encourage 
rather than to suppress difference. Thus, while culture is still viewed as a process of 
'humanisation', the desire to regulate this process has been displaced by new 
'cultural values' whereby the "perpetual, irreducible ... diversity of human kind" (p. 
18) is seen as something that intellectuals must defend. 
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Accompanying this apparent shift in the perception of culture, Bauman suggests 
that we are witnessing perhaps an equally dramatic epistemological shift away from 
viewing knowledge as a legislative tool towards an inte1pretive approach to reason. 
Such a claim suggests more than an epistemological shift contained within the ranks 
of conventional thought. Instead it promises a fundamental move away from a 
hierarchical model of knowledge underpinned by notions of an external and stable 
standard of truth and reason. In a postmodern era characterised by the "pennanent 
and irreducible pluralism of cultures" (p. 102), the focus of concern becomes not 
how to homogenise the cultural realm but how "to secure communication and 
mutual understanding between cultures" (p. 102). Thus, in drawing authority from 
an interpretive rather than a legislative role in society Bauman argues that the 
intellectual moves from servicing "the structure of domination (to facilitating) the 
process of reciprocal communication" (p. 126). 
The transformation of modern culture has been accompanied by a resurgence of 
interest in the cultural realm in the academy. However, this renewed interest seems 
to represent a recognition of the obsolescence of modernist notions of culture rather 
than an attempt at reclaiming legislative authority. Instead of reproducing another 
totalising model of culture, postmodern intellectuals are, as Bauman suggests, 
seeking to rethink culture in a much more complex and differentiated way. The new 
concern with pluralism and difference calls for a completely new approach to the 
study of culture. As the role of the intellectual shifts from that of cultural overseer 
to interpreter, the process of cultural inquiry involves a more localised focus on the 
multiple 'life worlds' that are seen to make up the cultural realm rather than seeking 
a totalising, homogeneous overview. Instead of trying to extract cultural processes 
from their local contexts and universalising the particular meanings of cultural 
events, the emphasis falls on examining cultural context itself and its local 
meanings, as characterised by Geertz' s notion of 'thick description'. 2 
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Such an approach to representing the cultural reflects a new intellectual mode 
of being where knowledge, having no recourse to extralinguistical standards of 
correctness only has validity within the bounds of a particular community of 
discourse. In this interpretive model of reason, truth claims are viewed as particular, 
contingent and contestable. Consequently, with no external standards of agreement, 
communication between systems of knowledge becomes problematic. Peters 
(1992), quoting Featherstone, contends that the role of the intellectual becomes that 
of cu.ltural interpreter liaising between discursive fields, translating and interpreting 
"the multiplicity of life-worlds and language games from the human cultural 
archive" (p. 30). With this redefinition of culture from an objective, structured 
entity to a "spontaneous process [my emphasis]. .. free of an overall design and 
perpetuated by diffusely deployed powers" (Bauman, 1992, p. 23 ), the study of 
culture becomes a hermeneutic exercise where issues of politics and domination are 
displaced by problems of interpretation and meaning . 
While modernity's rational ordered conception of culture was accompanied by a 
desire to legislate against difference, there appears to be a more liberatory intent 
underlying the contemporary emphasis on cultural diversity. The interpretive 
intellectual, in emphasising a more postmodern approach to culture with its 
accompanied displacement of traditional, rigid categories based on distinctions 
2 Utilising a Weberian language of interpretation, Geertz "embraces understanding and 
particularism while rejecting causal explanation" (Biersack, 1989, p. 75). For Geertz, cultural analysis 
involves what he terms 'thick description', where 'thickness' denotes the symbolic value of particular 
social acts. Such an approach involves 'reading' cultural processes and action as symbolically 
meaningful texts in their own right rather than imposing a functionalist cause-and-effect model onto 
the complex and often contradictory nature of social action. 
16 
between high and low culture, appears to advocate a more democratic focus on 
difference. However, theorists like Fredric Jameson (1989) have sought to 
problematise this apparent democratisation of culture. Jameson is sceptical of the 
supposed radicalism of intellectuals who align themselves with a cultural politics of 
pluralism. While on the one hand cultural pluralism contains a radical impulse in 
that it problematises hierarchies of knowledge, at the same time Jameson voices 
concerns that "the very concept of differentiation .. .is itself a systemic one" (p. 35) 
derived from the cultural logic of late capitalism. It is important then to view the 
liberatory claims of the interpretive intellectuals that I discuss in this thesis in a 
critical manner taking into account Michael Peters' (1992) observation that in 
postmodern society "cultural production has reached a stage where reflexive, critical 
distance from it is both less obvious and less possible" (p. 26). 
The Logic of Ambivalence: Recapturing Intellectual Authority? 
The condition of postmodemity can be seen as representing a crisis of the role 
and status of intellectuals in general. If the intellectual must "renounce a position of 
privilege" (Peters, 1992, p. 21) as a cultural authority where does the legitimacy of 
intellectual discourse now reside? The increasing prevalence of interpretive rather 
than legislative strategies suggests a "contemporary reorientation of cultural 
discourse" that reflects "the changing experience of intellectuals, as they seek to re-
establish their social function . .in a world ill-fit for their traditional role" (Bauman, 
1993, p. 24). Such interpretive strategies are no longer founded on external imposed 
standards of truth. Instead, they call upon a logic of difference; a logic that defies 
hierarchies of truth and knowledge and undennines any claim the modem 
intellectual might have had to a legislative reason. 
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The three theorists I discuss in this thesis self-consciously attempt to work 
through this crisis of authority in their writing. While the theoretical strategies they 
develop differ somewhat, all three theorists share a concern with actively reacting 
against the modem intellectual's legislative role. They seek to legitimate their 
social function as intellectuals through an outward rejection of the holy grail of 
modernity, the quest for certainty. Rather than attempting to reclaim some kind of 
authority founded on a totalising theory of knowledge, these theorists consciously 
resist imposing a systematised order on what they see as the chaos of everyday 
existence. In an effort to problematise modernity's obsession with order and 
hierarchy, they openly embrace ambivalence, uncertainty and ambiguity in their 
work. Ambivalence, as "the possibility of assigning an object or an event to more 
than one category" (p. 1 ), represents the antithesis of Aristotelian logic. Thus for the 
interpretive intellectual, ambivalence becomes more than a playful postmodern 
trope. Rather, in embracing the possibilities of ambivalence at an epistemological 
level these interpretive theorists seek to openly reject the tenets of western 
metaphysics. 
Before proceeding with an examination of the work of Richard Rorty, the first 
of the interpretive theorists I discuss, it is necessary to briefly outline the 
relationship between western metaphysics and legislative reason. I see the work of 
interpretive theorists like Rorty as very much post-modem in its concerns and as 
such as emerging out of and as a reaction to modernity and its reliance on legislative 
reason. While the interpretive 'tum' taking place within the academy in part reflects 
a desire to come to terms with present concerns in a postmodern pluralist society, it 
also represents an attempt to deal with the past. The point of concern for 
postmodern theorists lies with the profoundly oppressive consequences of 
modernity's supposedly liberatory goals. They claim that the dream of modernity 
with its humanist ideals has turned sour underscoring the "limits of reason and the 
obsolescence of modernist categories and institutions" (Lather, 1989, p. 5). In the 
hands of the modem intellectual it seems that reason has become a tool of 
domination legitimating state practices of social control. 
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In particular, the "naming and classifying" practices associated with the 
ordering strategies of legislative reason have a logical, if unintentional, affinity with 
the gatekeeping functions of the state (Bauman, 1993, p. 26). In the political realm, 
unity and order are achieved through the process of constructing a sharply 
demarcated 'organic structure' that eradicates any possibility of ambiguity. The 
state's attempt to purge the social order of ambivalence involves a clear demarcation 
of inside from outside, friend from enemy; that is, it relies on a process of 
segregation and exclusion.3 Likewise, in the intellectual realm, the process of 
ordering knowledge involves practices of segregation and exclusion that result in 
"delegitimising all grounds of knowledge that are philosophically uncontrolled or 
uncontrollable" (p. 24 ). The system of hierarchical dualisms underpinning western 
metaphysics is centrally concerned with organising the world into discrete, mutually 
exclusive entities. Language, in accordance with its naming function, aims to 
impose a structure on "a contingent world of randomness" (p. 1) so that the world 
becomes an orderly place of probability and predictability rather than randomness 
and contingency. This structuring process entails eliminating randomness and 
incommensurability by sorting entities into assigned classes. The logic and 
3 Bauman (1993) uses the example of the modem scientist's preoccupation with genetic 
homogeneity in order to illustrate the state's concern with eradicating ambivalence. For instance, he 
discusses the case of the Jewish psychiatrist, who in 1935 advocated the compulsory sterilisation of all 
heterozygous carriers of the "abnormal gene of schizophrenia" (p. 29) even though such a programme 
would involve sterilising 18 per cent of the total population. As Bauman demonstrates, Nazi 
Germany's focus on racial purity was one symptom of a much wider modem concern with social 
engineering in general. 
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systematicity of this process is guaranteed by the universal laws of reason. Given 
that the task of creating order is both the central concern of western metaphysics and 
the archetypal project of modernity (p. 4) it becomes possible to see how the 
ambitions of the modern state and of modern intellectuals might converge. 
Bauman points out that the 'discovery' of order accompanied the development 
of a modern concern with design and action. Prior to this obsession with certainty, 
modem conceptions of chaos and order as mutually exclusive terms had no 
meaning. In modernity, chaos is perceived as the only alternative to order and, 
furthermore, order is the positively weighted term in the equation. Chaos is thus 
const.ructed in solely negative terms as the "other of order...the miasma of the 
indeterminate and unpredictable." (p. 7). The modem intellectual is thus confined 
within a dialectical model of the world. Rather than accepting numerous ways of 
ordering/representing the world, this model depends on a binary opposition that sets 
"transparency against obscurity, clarity against fuzziness" (p. 7). This opposition 
represents a model of hierarchy and mastery where the chaotic, pre-human, 'natural' 
realm is subordinated to the artificial, humanising process of imposed order. 
According to Bauman's argument, it is apparent that the modem intellectual's 
role revolves to a large extent around social engineering and design in an effort to 
"manage and administer existence" (p. 7). In this process the modern polity is 
centrally concerned with attempting to eradicate uncertainty and ambivalence. The 
rigid categorisation and naming processes that accompany this modem practice 
inevitably produce intolerance of difference. The 'other' then becomes everything 
that defies simple classification or chooses to define itself in a way which subverts 
official ordering systems. In modern intellectual discourse the other "is polysemy, 
cognitive dissonance, polyvalent definitions, contingency". Western metaphysics 
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thus relies upon "reducing the flux and heterogeneity of experience into binary and 
supposedly natural or essentialist oppositions that include identity/difference, 
nature/culture" (Flax, 1990, p. 36) in order to represent reality as a coherent and 
unified whole. 4 
In contrast, the theorists I have chosen to discuss under the umbrella term of 
interpretive or postmodern theory share a concern with "what structures exclude in 
order to institute themselves as fictive totalities, as organised, coherent, 
homogeneous, logical systems" (Rabine, 1988, p. 13). Modernity's totalising 
theories depend on excluding and repressing difference and 'otherness'. However, 
as Bauman (1993) points out paradoxically the modem concern with order draws its 
impetus from a continual awareness of the impossibility of such an "ambivalence-
eliminating project" (p. 9). As the blurring of categorical boundaries and the non-
exclusivity of naming processes inevitably becomes apparent, ambivalence reveals 
itself to be a natural by-product of classificatory procedures. As Bauman indicates, 
the more rigid the structuring process the more likely the possibility of categorical 
ambiguity. 
Thus the 'metanarratives' of modernity are haunted by a modem culture 
conscious of its own constructed and artificial nature. The search for order is always 
at the same time a response to, and negation of, the flux and impermanence of the 
external world. 5 It is this self-conscious awareness of the conventionality and 
constructedness of modernity's own projects that seems to be at the root of the 
4 This contemporary critique of modernity's repressive aspects echoes the concerns of one the 
leading critics ofEnlightenment thought, Max Weber. Weber problematised the Enlightenment 
thinker's faith in the intrinsic connection between science, rationality and human freedom. Weber's 
powerful image of the "iron cage" ofbureaucratic rationality, in particular, reflects his belief that "the 
legacy of the Enlightenment was the triumph of ... purposive-instrumental rationality" that legislated 
against the possibility ofuniversal freedom (In Harvey, 1989, p. 15). 
5 Marsha11 Berman (1983) captures this dialectic vision when he describes modernity as "a 
paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity: it pours us all into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and 
renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish" (p. 15). 
demise of the modern intellectual. The postmodern condition represents for the 
intellectual an experience of total self-recognition to the point where legislative 
practices can no longer be justified through a blind faith in reason. While the 
modern intellectual still seeks a deeper structure of understanding beneath the 
dialectic experience of modernity, the postmodern thinker sees nothing beyond the 
culturally constructed surface of modern existence. 
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The postmodern experience for the intellectual signifies then an acute 
awareness of the fictional, totalising and exclusionary nature of modernity's quest 
for certainty. The turn to interpretation reflects a desire to liberate intellectualism 
from .the demands of legislative reason. 6 Rorty, Clifford and Lather, as interpretive 
thinkers sceptical of the authority or utility of reason, actively reclaim ambivalence 
and indeterminacy in their work as a means of undermining universalist claims to 
truth. As Jane Flax (1990) posits, ambivalence is "an appropriate response to an 
inherently conflictual situation. The problem lies not in the ambivalence, but in 
premature attempts to resolve or deny conflicts" (p. 11 ). Accordingly, the 
interpretive approach associated with postmodern theory involves "a refusal to avoid 
conflict and irresolvable differences or to synthesise these differences into a unitary, 
uni vocal whole" (p. 4 ). 
In utilising the notion of ambivalence, however, I would argue that caution must 
be exercised in order not to revert to the kind of oppositional thinking that has 
6 David Harvey (1989) argues that the "counter-cultural and anti-modernist movements of the 
1960s" that ironically emerged out of modernism, could be seen as a "cultural and political harbinger 
of the subsequent turn to postmodernism" (p. 38). Like the interpretive intellectual, these anti-
modernist thinkers and activists were "antagonistic to the oppressive qualities of scientifically 
grounded technical-bureaucratic rationality as purveyed through monolithic corporate, state and other 
forms ofinstitutionalised power ... [ celebrating instead] a distinctive 'new left' politics [that was 
characterised by] the embrace of anti-authoritarian gestures, iconoclastic habits ... and the critique of 
everyday life" (p. 38). 
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rendered the whole project of modernity so problematic. As we have seen the 
conception of certainty and ambivalence as mutually exclusive opposites is a 
distinctly modernist one. Like certainty, the notion of ambivalence can be viewed as 
a kind of powerful fiction that can be used by intellectuals in a variety of politically 
expedient ways. Ambivalence then is a far from neutral or 'natural' concept, rather 
it carries an ideological significance in so far as it represents the 'other' of 
categorical certainty. If the modem obsession with certainty is only meaningful in 
its negation and subordination of ambivalence, what can we make of the 
interpretative tum within the academy where ambivalence is valorised and the 
search for order put into question? Does such an approach reflect a rejection of 
mod~m concerns or does it merely represent a reversal of the chaos/order 
dichotomy, a reinscription of modem values? 
Bauman (1993) argues that postmodemity does not necessarily reflect the end of 
modernity but rather may be seen to represent "modernity coming of age" (p. 272). 
What appears to distinguish the postmodern experience from that of modernity is an 
acute sense of the constructed nature of truth and culture and a concomitant 
problematisation of intellectual authority. Whether this self-consciousness bestows 
on the postmodern intellectual some kind of autonomy from legislative political 
ambitions is another matter. What remains to be seen is whether embracing 
ambivalence results in an emancipatory politics of difference or whether the 
interpretive intellectual's anti-theoretical stance inadvertently provides an 
"ideological alibi" (Zavarzadeh, 1994, p. 4) for a new phase of capitalism driven by 
a logic of differentiation. 
The following chapters deal with the current crisis of intellectual authority and 
with the subsequent inquiry into the possibility, meaning and limitations of 
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'knowledge' in a postmodern age. In particular, I focus on the work ofRorty, 
Clifford and Lather, three pivotal postmodern theorists who are attempting to come 
to grips with the displacement of the modem intellectual from a "privileged relation 
to truth and knowledge" (Flax, 1990, p. 190). While these theorists apparently 
accept this displacement (Rorty (1979), for example, in Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature happily pronounces the death of Philosophy) my interest lies in the ways 
these interpretive theorists attempt to reclaim some kind of authoritative terrain. 
While applauding the interpretive intellectual's rejection of the authoritarianism of 
western metaphysics, I remind the reader that the postmodern theorists I deal with in 
this text are by no means "free from a will to power whose effects they trace 
else"7here" (Flax, 1990, p. 192). In particular, it is important to keep in mind the 
fact that the discourse of ambivalence despite its seemingly liberatory intent bears 
an ambiguous relationship to a radical politics of emancipation. My aim then is to 
examine whether the interpretive approach to knowledge is able to entirely 
disentangle itself from the modernist legacy which acts as its starting point. Finally 
I ask whether the politics of indeterminacy proposed by postmodern theory offers a 
realisable alternative to the hegemonic discourses of modernity. 
II 
FROM EPISTEMOLOGY TO HERMENEUTICS : 
DETHEORISING KNOWLEDGE 
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In the previous chapter I argued that intellectuals are currently experiencing a 
crisis of authority due in part to a loss of faith in the foundational myths of Western 
culture. Given this general crisis there has been much debate over the role that the 
intellectual might play in a postmodern society. Richard Rorty, the pragmatist 
philosopher, has been an important voice in this conversation about intellectual 
authority. He argues that the traditional notion of the philosopher as a natural 
guardian of truth and rationality is now an outmoded and questionable ideal. Rorty 
posits that the meta-narratives of certainty and rationality that once governed 
modem society and legitimised the legislative role of the intellectual have been 
place.cl in question. I would argue that, like Bauman, Rorty is suggesting that we are 
witnessing a general trend away from legislative approaches to reason to an 
interpretive model of knowledge. 
For intellectuals to regain some degree ofrelevancy in contemporary society, 
Rorty argues that we must abandon the modem epistemologically-centred approach 
to knowledge and replace it with a more democratic, utilitarian model of knowledge. 
His work on philosophical pragmatism constitutes an important contribution to this 
trend towards an alternative model of knowledge. Like Bauman, Rorty (1979) is 
critical of the modem conception of culture, viewing the modem quest for order and 
certainty as a "desire for constraint" (p. 315). Instead, Rorty offers "the notion of 
culture as a conversation rather than a structure erected on foundations" (p. 319). 
Rorty' s conversational or hermeneutic model of knowledge and culture draws upon 
pragmatism and textualism in a self-conscious rejection of modem cultural values 
and ideals. Accordingly, Rorty hopes to displace these culturally dominant, modem 
'metanarratives' with an approach to knowledge that legitimises, rather than 
legislates against, cultural pluralism and diversity. Thus, in Rorty's post-
Philosophical culture, he sees the role of the intellectual shifting from that of a 
legislator, upholding universal Western values, to that of an interpreter, liaising 
between cultural groups in order to encourage 'edifying conversation'. 
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In this chapter I will map out Rorty' s critique of traditional legislative 
approaches to knowledge and his discussion of pragmatism and textualism as 
'interpretive' alternatives to traditional, epistemologically-based philosophy. This 
will involve an examination ofRorty's conception of knowledge as 'edifying 
conversation' and the role that the intellectual might have in relation to this anti-
legislative approach to knowledge. While there is no doubt that Rorty's 
phil~sophical writings represent a radical departure from traditional approaches to 
knowledge, the question remains as to whether an interpretive approach to 
knowledge translates into an equally radical and emancipatory politics. The chapter 
concludes, then, with a discussion of Rorty's conversational model of knowledge in 
relation to his liberal democratic political agenda. I examine what I see as Rorty's 
essentially conservative politics as a means of raising some concerns about the role 
of Bauman' s interpretive intellectual vis a vis the process of social change. 
Philosophy and the Quest for Certainty 
To a large extent, Rorty's work represents a reaction against the dominance of 
what he calls 'foundationalist' discourses in Western culture. Rorty sees these 
legislative discourses as impeding rather than encouraging freedom of thought and 
the possibilities of reasoned dialogue. In the philosophical arena, Rorty is critical of 
the kind of instrumental reason underpinning mainstream philosophy, where 
mainstream philosophy sees itself as a 'science' of knowledge qualified to dictate 
and police the objectivity and legitimacy of the truth claims of other discourses. 
Rorty aims to demystify philosophy and its accompanying myths of universal truth 
and reason by placing Western metaphysics in a cultural and historical context. 
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According to Rorty, the development of what he refers to as Philosophy with a 
capital p, that is that brand of philosophy that sees itself as providing a sure 
foundation for all knowledge, is a relatively recent event. He argues that the 
paradigm of knowing didn't become a privileged area of human activity in Western 
culture until "Descartes' conception of knowing [ which was defined in terms of] 
having correct representations in an internal space, the mind" (Rabinow, 1986, p. 
235) pecame the dominant philosophical discourse. Following Descartes, 
knowledge became synonymous with accurate representation. However, it wasn't 
until Kant legitimised the Cartesian claim that we only have certainty about ideas 
that it was possible for an epistemologically-based philosophy to be seen as a 
foundational science grounding all claims to knowledge. 
For Rorty ( 1979), Kant is a pivotal figure in the development of a separate 
theory of knowledge whereby philosophers were finally seen to be "presiding over a 
tribunal of pure reason" (p. 139) and therefore able to judge the validity of the truth 
claims of other disciplines. Kant transformed the role of philosophy from dealing 
with transcendental, metaphysical concerns to that of a "foundational discipline" (p. 
132). The story ofpost-kantian, modern philosophy thus revolves around a concern 
with epistemology; that is, "the equation of knowledge with internal representations 
and the correct evaluations of those representations" (Rabinow, 1986, p. 234). 
Rorty's description of the development of modern philosophy echoes Bauman's 
portrayal of the birth of modern culture in that they are both stories about a struggle 
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over the determination and control of knowledge and the subsequent eradication of 
pluralism. For Rorty (1979), the canonisation of Philosophy, with its focus on 
theories of knowledge, represents "the triumph of the quest for certainty over the 
quest for reason" (p. 161 ). Rorty sees the desire for totalising theories of knowledge 
as representing a need for order and hierarchy rather than a desire for knowledge. 
The central focus on epistemology reflects a concern with "the clarification and 
judgment of the subject's representations" (Rabinow, 1986,p. 235), which, in tum, 
leads to a preoccupation with the legislation and policing of the boundaries of 
'knowledge' and 'non-knowledge'. 
Rorty (1979), however, wishes to topple the modem philosopher from his/her 
privileged position as arbiter of Truth by placing into question the modem concept 
of knowledge as accurate representation (p. 318). For Rorty, such an ideal relies on 
privileging certain kinds of representation as 'foundational'. By presupposing a 
universal set of terms within which all knowledge is commensurable the process of 
rational inquiry is reduced from the outset to an inevitably tautological search for 
order. The notion that all knowledge is commensurable relies on a Kantian ideal of 
truth and consensus. Such an ideal presupposes that all discourses will, in the end, 
lead us to a final truth or fundamental vocabulary underpinning all knowledge. Thus 
the desire for commensurability ( that is, the eradication of ambivalence) is linked to 
the modem quest for certainty; a quest that Rorty condemns as authoritarian and 
legislative in intent. 
In order to move away from this obsession with discovering a "permanent 
framework for inquiry" (p. 380) it seems we must set aside the notion that 
knowledge is about accurately 'mirroring' the external world. As Rorty takes great 
pains to illustrate, the implicit faith in "a pennanent, ahistorical, commensurating 
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vocabulary" (p. 392) that underlies epistemologically-based philosophy is more an 
"historical accident" (p. 391) than a reflection of some fundamental structure 
underlying human thought. For Bauman, of course, the centrality offoundationalist 
Philosophy in the history of modem intellectualism is by no means accidental but, 
instead, reflects the ideological and legislative needs of the evolving nation state. 
From a 'pragmatic' point of view, Rorty's point here is that Philosophy's dominance 
as a cultural discourse has nothing to do with it being a 'truer' or more rational 
approach to knowledge than other philosophical discourses. Indeed, Rorty perceives 
Philosophy's reliance on epistemology and method as impeding rather than 
facilitating rational thought (p. 318). 
Pragmatism and Hermeneutics: Against Certainty 
For Rorty, then, it is time for us to discard such an outdated and flawed 
foundationalist conception of knowledge. His suggestion is that we need to move 
beyond representational models of knowledge to a more hermeneutic approach to 
philosophy. Rorty' s hermeneutic model of knowledge draws heavily from 
pragmatist philosophy, although, as I will show later, his work is also influenced by 
'Continental' theorists such as Jacques Derrida. Like Continental philosophy, 
pragmatism has been a marginalised voice within traditional Philosophy. However, 
with the general trend away from legislative reason, philosophical counter-
movements like pragmatism are now taking on a more dominant role in discussions 
about the nature of knowledge and intellectualism. 
Pragmatism was founded by William James and John Dewey, two American 
philosophers who were deeply critical of the attempt to tum philosophy into a 
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foundational discipline. Their work entails a reaction against the Kantian 
assumption that philosophy can provide us with an "all-embracing ahistorical 
context" (Rorty, 1982, p. 161) via a theory of truth or knowledge. They argue that 
the desire for a theory of truth implies that truth has some essence and the desire for 
a founding truth implies that there are specific ways to discover truth. 
As Rorty points out, there has been much debate as to the nature of Truth within 
the ranks of traditional philosophy. This debate essentially falls into two camps. 
One side is represented by the transcendental philosophers who perceive of truth as 
something existing on a higher plane transcending mundane human reality. The 
other.side consists of the positivists who hold a correspondence view of reality 
whereby Truth can be discovered in the natural world using the tools of reason and 
rationality. According to Rorty, pragmatists are often accused of being positivists 
because of their anti-Platonist (or anti-idealist) stance. While the pragmatist shares 
with the positivist the belief that knowledge is "a tool for coping with reality" (p. 
xvii), the pragmatist rejects the notion that truth corresponds with, or mirrors, 
reality. In terms of science, then, the positivist insists that science aids us in dealing 
with reality because scientific truth corresponds with the natural world. In contrast, 
the pragmatist argues that science merely enables us to cope. 
As a pragmatist, Rorty is critical of Philosophy's assertion that something called 
the 'scientific method' has enabled scientists to have privileged access to the real. 
The success of science, Rorty argues, has little to do with the application of a 
rational and objective method. He suggests that scientific 'discoveries' are useful 
because they work in a particular context, using a particular vocabulary- not because 
they reflect the presence of an external, objective reality. 
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Thus, for the pragmatist the idea of a theory of truth is philosophically 
uninteresting and moreover not particularly useful. They believe that theories of 
knowledge that specify the boundaries between good and bad knowledge, truth and 
falsity in terms of general, normative laws ironically make it more difficult to say 
something true or to think rationally. If philosophers frame their questions about the 
world in terms of foundational notions of truth and reason then the answers they 
'discover' will inevitably be cast in the same mould. For the pragmatist such an 
approach to knowledge involves spending too much time obeying epistemological 
rules rather than doing critical research. 
In contrast to the Kantian approach to knowledge, the pragmatist sees the 
process of reasoning, ideally, as an open conversation between competing and often 
contradictory discourses rather than as an epistemologically-grounded monologue. 
The notion that we can reduce the process of rationality to a set of rules or a fixed 
method is anathema to the pragmatist who views inquiry as "deliberation concerning 
the relative attractions of various concrete alternatives" (p. 164 ). The pragmatist 
denies that there is one correct way of conducting a course of inquiry. Rorty thus 
sums up pragmatism as a doctrine that posits "that there are no constraints on 
inquiry save conversational ones" (p. 165). While the "anti-pragmatists follow Plato 
in striving for an escape from conversation to something atemporal which lies in the 
background of all possible conversations" (p. 174), according to pragmatism, there 
are no extra-human structures of truth 'out there' guiding our modes of inquiry. The 
fundamental difference between Philosophy and pragmatism then is the latter's 
acceptance of the contingency of knowledge. 
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Pragmatism, Textualism and the Contingency of.Knowledge 
As previously stated, Rorty's philosophical interests lie more with the counter-
tradition in philosophy associated with the work of pragmatists like Dewey, as well 
as the Continental theorists, than with the mainstream writings of foundationalist 
philosophers like Kant. The 'heretical' writings of these anti-foundationalist 
philosophers produced not only the pragmatic trend within philosophy but also 
influenced the more linguistically centred work of textualist philosophers like Paul 
De Man and Derrida. Rorty (1991) has recently suggested that he sees Western 
culture becoming increasingly "poeticised" as it moves away from "scientism" (p. 
110)._ Such a comment reveals Rorty's leanings towards literary approaches to 
knowledge which he perceives as less constrained by methodology and objectivity 
than other disciplines. While he is critical of what he sees as the tendency for 
textualism to degenerate into an epistemology of language, he sees the goals of 
pragmatism and textualism as being aligned in many ways. Like the textualists, 
Rorty seeks to align philosophy with the interpretive activities of the literary realm 
rather than the traditional legislative mode associated with Philosophy. Through 
emphasising the 'writerly' or constructed nature of all discourses, textualism, like 
pragmatism, is concerned to point out the contingency of knowledge. 
According to Rorty, textualism is concerned with displacing science from its 
position of dominance. Here science is defined as the sort of activity concerned 
with rigorous argument where the bounds of debate are preset and the goal is 
consensus. For the textualist, science represents a foundationalist discourse that 
attempts to displace the contingency of all meaning with a rhetoric of certainty. 
Thus, scientific objectivity represents "mere conformity to rule" (Rorty, 1982, p. 
14 3) rather than a means of accessing truth. Instead of depending on "the comforts 
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and textualists alike see this desire to escape the conventionality and contingency of 
language as a central flaw within Philosophical thinking. 
It seems then that the anti-foundationalist critiques of pragmatist and textualist 
philosophers intersect at a number of theoretical points. Indeed, Rorty argues that 
the work of pragmatists like Dewey anticipated many of the concerns of Continental 
philosophy. Furthermore, Rorty asserts that the trajectory of the work of theorists 
like Foucault and Deleuze was heading in a pragmatic direction. Whether Rorty's 
claims about the ascendancy of pragmatism are valid or not, it is clear that the 
current interest in pragmatism and continental theory supports the existence of a 
larger linguistic or interpretive 'turn' gaining influence across the humanities. 
Rorty's work captures the most radical anti-foundationalist aspects of both 
pragmatism and textualism, and thereby represents the leading edge of this anti-
legislative, anti-theoretical 'movement'. 
From the Universal to the Local: The Philosopher as Cultural Interpreter 
Given that Rorty' s pragmatic, linguistically-based critique of epistemologically-
centred discourses places into question the role and authority of the modem 
intellectual, a number of questions emerge. In a discussion about the debate 
between pragmatism and intuitive realism, Rorty (1982) concludes that "the issue is 
one about whether philosophy should try to find natural starting-points which are 
distinct from cultural traditions, or whether all philosophy should do is compare and 
contrast cultural traditions" (p. xxxvii). This central problematic captures 
particularly well the issues that have been highlighted in this recent debate about the 
intellectual's role in contemporary society. In tenns ofBauman's thesis, Rorty's 
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intellectual is faced with choosing between a legislative versus an interpretive 
approach to knowledge. As a legislative intellectual, the intuitive realist believes 
there is a Philosophical truth beyond textuality, a foundational knowledge "to which 
various texts are trying to be 'adequate'" (p. xxxvii). This belief in an extra-cultural 
blueprint of knowledge is closely linked with the modern quest for certainty. The 
realist acquires knowledge in a progressive fashion, striving to piece together, in a 
jigsaw-like fashion, the fragments of this blueprint. The goal is to bring order and 
certainty to the philosophical process so that the Philosopher can confidently judge 
the adequacy of various forms of knowledge. Thus, the legislative intellectual or 
philosopher is reliant on a universalistic theory of knowledge that can found all truth 
claims. 
However, as we have seen, textualists and pragmatists alike have pronounced 
the death of Philosophy as a foundational science. The Philosopher can no longer 
claim to have a privileged, neutral or objective view of a reality existing outside 
language and culture. In Rorty's post-Philosophical culture, the philosopher still has 
tenure but not as an omniscient guardian of truth or social justice. For philosophy to 
reclaim some kind of cultural authority or relevance it must, suggests the textually-
influenced Rorty, self-consciously align itself with literary rather than scientific 
discourses, a move which involves exchanging the legislative vocabulary of Truth 
and Reason for the language of interpretation. In emphasising the role of the 
philosopher as that of an interpreter rather than a legislator, the intellectual is free to 
abandon pretences to objectivity and can instead treat philosophical discourse "as 
sharing a narrative and anecdotal style with the novelist and the journalist" (p. 203). 
For Rorty, the scientific obsession with objectivity stems from the modem 
intellectual's desire that the world "be guided, constrained, not left to its own 
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devices" (p. xxxix). The pragmatist wants to free the intellectual from this pursuit 
of certainty and from the legislative role that accompanies it. Thus, Rorty's 
interpretive intellectual is concerned less with determining the boundaries of what 
constitutes 'good' knowledge than with liaising between different vocabularies and 
cultures. The post-Philosophical intellectual becomes a cultural commentator, 
analysing the various modes of thought of our time, referring to "sets of 
descriptions, symbol systems, ways of seeing" (p. xl), rather than to some 
ahistorical, extra-cultural standards. 
Conversation and Community: Cultural Dialogue and the Production of 
Meaning 
As Rorty (1979) points out, the interpretive intellectual needs to move beyond 
the constraints of epistemology and method ifs/he is to offer an alternative to the 
current preoccupation with systematising and objectifying knowledge (p. 315). The 
question then becomes what happens to status of intellectual inquiry once we have 
moved 'beyond representation'? It would seem that given the apparent 
demystification and deauthorisation of the role of the modem intellectual in society, . 
the process of knowledge production in an apparently postmodern era takes on a 
whole new meaning. Rorty suggests that for the new interpretive intellectual the 
utility of knowledge can no longer be judged in relation to some external, non-
human reality but instead should be viewed in terms of its contribution to the 
community. The role of the postmodern intellectual would then revolve around 
strengthening the sense of community rather than imposing some arbitrary 
transcultural set of values onto the community. 
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Rorty (1991) points out that it is partly a fear of parochialism that has driven the 
desire for objectivity (p. 21). Modem intellectualism involves actively estranging or 
alienating oneself from one's community in order to transcend the contingency of 
everyday existence. However, once we realise that there are no metaphysical truths 
grounding intellectual inquiry, Rorty suggests that, rather than trying to escape the 
perceived limitations of one's community, we must tum to the possibilities of the 
social group for guidance. The focus of knowledge production would then shift 
from a concern with mapping the "relation between human beings and the objects of 
their inquiry [to a hermeneutic focus on] the (historical) relation between alternative 
standards of justification" (Rorty, 1979, p. 389). In this relational view of 
kno"':'ledge(s) there is no meta-discourse that one can turn to in order to guarantee 
the truth or falsity of an argument; rather, there are multiple discourses each of 
which represents a strand "in a possible conversation" (p. 318). 
In short, Rorty (1982) is suggesting we shift the emphasis in knowledge 
production from a desire for objectivity to a Deweyan concern with the relations 
between knowledge and "human solidarity" (p. 204 ). Rorty sees the modem 
concern with cultural and epistemological order as legislating against the pluralist 
possibilities of the community. As his critiques of legislative reason have 
demonstrated, Philosophy tends to eradicate the possibility of multiple discourses in 
its search for a final vocabulary. In contrast, Rorty perceives an interpretive 
approach to knowledge as enabling a diversity of sub-cultures to co-exist. Rorty' s 
dialogic or conversational model, in portraying knowledge formation as a shifting 
and contested intersubjective process, opens up the possibility of multiple 
knowledges or truths. Such a model legitimises rather than marginalises difference. 
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The recognition that knowledge formation is a discursive rather than an 
objective process and is embedded in social practices leads Rorty (1979) to posit 
that the goal of thinking should become "education" rather than "knowledge" and 
that such "edifying" approaches to philosophy should revolve around '~the way 
things are said [rather than] the possession of truths" (p. 359). Here there is no 
privileged mode of speech that will lead to a conversational consensus but instead "a 
potential infinity of vocabularies" (p. 367) all of which represent different ways of 
describing the world. When knowledge is viewed in terms of 'edifying' 
conversation rather than the acquisition of Truth, the focus moves beyond an 
objective structured reality to an examination of the role of the social subject in the 
production of meaning. 
The Politics of Pluralism: Radical Philosophy Meets American Liberalism 
This conversational approach to philosophy where knowledge is performed 1 
rather than 'discovered', anticipates the dialogic approach to ethnography and 
sociological research advocated by Clifford and Lather in the following chapters. 
The dialogic model represents more than a concern with developing new approaches 
to knowledge. It also reflects some attempt to redress the perceived 
authoritarianism and imperialism associated with traditional representational forms. 
Underpinning these theorists conceptualisation of knowledge as produced through 
1 The postmodern focus on the performative nature of knowledge involves foregrounding the 
theatrical and rhetorical aspects of meaning construction in order to problematise conventional 
referential models oflanguage. According to this performative model, meaning is constructed within a 
particular dramatic context rather than corresponding to some external symbolic structure. As 
Zavarzadeh (1994) states, "what is at stake here is not knowledge as content but knowledge as 
relation [my emphasis]" (p. 44). Thus, the postmodern performativist is concerned with displacing a 
dialectics of knowledge with a relational, dialogic approach that sees knowledge as produced in an 
intersubjective rather than an objective manner. 
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open, communal conversation lies an apparent concern with the politics of 
difference. In the first chapter I raised some concerns regarding the relationship 
between the interpretive intellectual and the radical, emancipatory goals associated 
with the politics of difference. The question that remains then is what sort of 
political system might accompany a conversational or dialogic approach to 
knowledge? 
For Rorty (1991), pragmatism represents "a philosophy tailored to the needs of 
political liberalism" (p. 211) rather than radicalism. He views the democratic, 
capitalist society as the most likely political environment to encourage cultural 
pluralism and diversity. Non-democratic societies that attempt to reach consensus 
through legislation diminish the possibilities for a diversity of doctrines and beliefs. 
According to Rorty, pluralism is achieved by encouraging a kind of politics of the 
local rather than imposing an external set of moral codes. Communities must 
determine their own laws and policies according to contingent, utilitarian needs. 
The demise of universalist myths about truth and justice means that, for example, 
the question of human rights can no longer be viewed in some ahistorical, 
universalist fashion but instead becomes "relatively local and ethnocentric [that is, 
determined by] the tradition of a particular community, the consensus of a particular 
culture" (p. 176). 
In such an 'ethnocentric' environment, the transcultural, ahistorical modern self 
is replaced with an identity constituted by community; that is a local and historical 
self. For Rorty, this historicised notion of the self and social justice is best suited to 
a liberal democracy where that polity allows for what Rorty, quoting Rawls, 
summarises as a "diversity of doctrines and [a] plurality of conflicting, and indeed 
incommensurable conceptions of [political justice]" (p. 179). In Rorty' s pragmatic 
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ideal of a democracy centrally concerned with justice, where "social policy needs no 
more authority than successful accommodation among individuals, individuals who 
find themselves heir to the same historical traditions and faced with the same 
problems" (p. 184), universalist concerns about the meaning of human existence 
will be detached from politics and reserved for private life. Thus, Rorty wishes to 
defend liberal institutions while discarding the kind of Kantian idealism that 
traditionally underpins a liberal democratic society. Calling himself, albeit in a 
tongue in cheek fashion, a postmodernist liberal, Rorty rejects modem 
metanarratives while preserving the liberal ideals and institutions which he sees as 
essential to a politics of cultural pluralism (p. 209). 
Rorty's pluralist politics, then, is underpinned by a concern for community 
values and human solidarity. In Rorty's democratic community each individual is 
theoretically able to hold any political, moral or religious belief no matter how 
extreme as long as these beliefs do not interfere with the integrated functioning of 
the community. While Rorty denounces the politics of consensus as a 
foundationalist ideal, his conversational approach to knowledge and politics relies 
on the notion that diverse discourses and cultures are not completely 
incommensurable or untranslatable but that all cultures share some beliefs and goals 
and are therefore able to communicate freely and meaningfully. When Lyotard 
suggests that there are times in political conversation when free and open 
communication cannot occur because one of the parties involved may be "deprived 
of the means of arguing" ( cited in Rorty, 1991, p. 216), Rorty accuses Lyotard of 
being unable to step outside the boundaries of a legislative mode of reasoning (p. 
217). Essentially, Rorty believes that we can move from a legislative to a purely 
interpretive approach to knowledge, reason and politics by switching our 
vocabularies from a judicial to a consensual (in the dialogic sense) language. 
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Communication, then, is not about the mastery of rules but instead depends on ones 
"ability to get along with other players of a language-game, a game played without 
referees" (p. 217). 
Rorty's politics of difference thus relies on the notion that knowledge can be 
separated from the will to power and put to the service of human solidarity. It seems 
that if his ideal of the possibility of cultural dialogue occurring unfettered by power 
or politics were a feasible one then a liberal democratic polity might prove the most 
appropriate setting for such a model. However, just as Rorty would argue that 
knowledge production cannot occur in some extra-cultural, ahistorical vacuum, I 
would suggest that the notion that cultural dialogue can be extracted from the 
network of social and power relations in which all such interactions occur, is a 
problematic one. Furthermore, there are a number of questions that such a 
conception of dialogue raises about Rorty's political intentions. Can Rorty's ideal 
of human solidarity coexist with a genuine concern for a politics of difference or 
does the notion of communicational 'consensus' merely encourage cultural 
homogeneity? Who would define the boundaries of Rorty' s local, pragmatically-
based community and at what point would such a definition become legislative in 
intent? 
The reformist politics to which Rorty adheres must give the radical intellectual 
some cause for concern with regard to the anti-legislative claims of the interpretive 
turn. As Steven Watts (1991) points out, recent appeals to 'community' and cultural 
pluralism by the poststructuralist Left have resulted largely in the "reproduction and 
intensification of uncritical, liberal pluralism [leaving intact the] fundamental 
structures of modern liberal culture" (p. 652-653). It would seem that Rorty's 
refusal to engage in discussions about knowledge and power, despite being posited 
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as an attempt to avoid using a legislative vocabulary, paradoxically prevents those 
marginalised groups that Rorty sets out to empower from entering into his pragmatic 
conversations. The tendency to ignore issues of power when focusing on the politics 
of interpretation results in effacing, rather than deconstructing, the very real 
structural constraints that diminish the possibility of cultural pluralism. In the 
concluding chapter of this thesis I expand on this critique of Rorty's conversational 
model of knowledge and politics in order to underscore the problematic nature of his 
pluralist politics vis a vis a radical politics of difference. 
Having examined the radical possibilities of Rorty' s ( anti-)theories about 
knowledge, we have witnessed the difficulties encountered in Rorty's attempts to 
translate this radical promise into political reality. While also a proponent of the 
dialogic approach to knowledge, James Clifford, whose critical work on 
ethnographic authority I address in the next chapter, is much more attuned to issues 
of power and knowledge than Rorty. In this sense Clifford's work seems to be more 
aligned with a Foucaultian approach to knowledge than with the kind ofDeweyan, 
idealistic, philosophy of knowledge-without-power associated with Rorty's 
pragmatism. The political possibilities of Clifford's work, where his interpretive 
approach to knowledge is tempered by a power analysis, seem more promising than 
Rorty' s rather naive pragmatism. The question remains, then, as to whether the 
interpretive intellectual, representing a conversational politics, can offer anything 
more than a reformist apology for liberalism. 
III 
TEXTUALISING CULTURE: ETHNOGRAPHY'S 
ENCOUNTER WITH LITERARY THEORY 
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Like the Philosopher, the ethnographer has recently been forced to come to 
grips with the general questioning of intellectual authority. As a discipline that has 
been concerned with representing the 'other', ethnography stands out as one of the 
more transparently power-laden discourses in the Academy. Not surprisingly, the 
modem ethnographer has often found him/herself having to defend the role and 
authority of the ethnographer. Up until now, the ethnographer has been able to 
respond to accusations of cultural imperialism by relying on scientific rationalism as 
a discourse of legitimation. As I have shown, however, the notion that the scientific 
method can guarantee the researcher any kind of cultural neutrality has been 
questioned from a number of sources. Furthermore, in an era of postcolonialism, 
where Western unitary categories like 'culture', 'identity' and 'ethnicity' have been 
problematised, it would seem that "the activity of cross cultural representation is 
now more than usually in question" (Clifford, 1983, p. 118). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the foundational discourses underpinning 
traditional notions of representation are gradually being undennined, not only in the 
realm of philosophy, but across the humanities. Up until recently, anthropology as a 
discipline has been rather slow to respond to the challenge offered up by 
"deconstructionist literary criticism" (Rabinow, 1986, p. 242). However, the 
emergence of 'meta-theorists' like James Clifford, a prominent anthropologist who 
is situated at the leading edge of critical debates regarding the general crisis of 
representation and the loss of disciplinary authority within ethnography, appears to 
signal ethnography's 'coming of age' in terms of critical theory. 
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Clifford, like Rorty in his criticism of Philosophy, draws heavily on literary 
theory or textualism to support his critical claims in his examination of the crisis of 
legitimation currently sweeping ethnography. As a textualist, Clifford is centrally 
concerned with making visible the literary aspect of ethnography, a dimension that 
has hitherto been marginalised or hidden within the research process. This is not to 
suggest that anthropologists have previously been completely unaware of issues 
relating to the narrativisation of social experience and the textually 'constructed' 
nature of culture. For example, since the publication of his groundbreaking and 
controversial work on the Balinese cockfight, Clifford Geertz has worked to blur the 
boundaries between anthropological and literary concerns. Most recently Biersack 
(198~) argues Geertz has contributed to and taken part in the major literary tum in 
anthropology, a tum which has witnessed a "shift in focus from culture-as-text...to 
anthropological texts ... and their rhetorical strategies" (p. 73). 
Rabinow (1986), however, draws a clear distinction between Geertz's 
"interpretive anthropology" which he sees as still primarily concerned with 
reinventing "anthropological science" using better textual strategies and Clifford's 
"textualist meta-anthropology" (p. 242-243). While Geertz's focus remains on the 
"social description of the other" (p. 242), Clifford seems to have become 
anthropology's postmodernist meta-scribe with his 'object' of study being that of 
ethnographic representation itself Thus, Clifford is concerned with 'exoticising' 
anthropological culture and its epistemological traditions; or, as Rabinow puts it, 
with othering "the anthropological representation of the other" (p. 242). 
In his focus on ethnography, Clifford is sceptical of the discipline's claims to a 
neutral representation of cultural groups. By foregrounding the processes of textual 
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production and the rhetorical strategies at work in the ethnographic text, Clifford 
(1986a) aims to reveal the "constructed, artificial nature of cultural accounts" (p. 2). 
He is centrally concerned, then, with denaturalising and demystifying the authority 
of the ethnographer. In the process of deconstructing the ethnographer' s claim to 
authority, he analyses the rhetorical strategies employed by the modem ethnographer 
in order to 'authorise' the text. Clifford is critical of the use ofrealist styles in 
ethnography in so far as the realist ethnographer tends to conceal the fabricated 
nature of ethnographic accounts. By showing that the ethnographer' s authority 
derives from specific, historically situated textual strategies, Clifford aims to open 
up the ethnographic space to the possibilities of new textual forms; anti-realist 
strategies that appear to offer radical possibilities not just for anthropology but for 
the humanities in general. 
Clifford does not see textualism as merely offering ethnography the possibility 
of better modes ofrepresentation. Instead, he sees a new textualist ethnography as 
providing a critical arena where social description is problematised. Like Rorty' s 
Philosopher, Clifford's traditional ethnographer is no longer able to justify sole 
claim to a privileged set of tools for cultural analysis. In an age of post-colonialism, 
ethnography's traditional concern with capturing the essence of the 'other' seems 
increasingly anachronistic. At the same time, the ethnographer has access to 
privileged insights, insights gained from being positioned "between powerful 
systems of meaning" (p. 2). For this reason, ethnography can still provide an 
important and authoritative contribution to any discussion about knowledge and 
power. Clifford views ethnography as occupying a space on "the boundaries of 
civilisations, classes, races and genders" (p. 2). Positioned as it is on these 
boundaries, ethnography is at the centre of debates about the politics and 
problematics of translation. It is, or could be, according to Clifford, "an emergent 
interdisciplinary phenomenon" (p. 3). 
Legislating Knowledge: The Scientisation of Ethnography 
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For Clifford (1988), the doubts that are increasingly being raised in relation to 
the validity and ethics of 'translating' the life worlds of culturally exotic 'others' 
into Western scientific discourse are "symptoms of a pervasive postcolonial crisis of 
ethnographic authority" (p. 8). Much of his work on the literary aspects of 
ethnographic processes emerges out of this wider challenge within the humanities 
towards the notion that the "West" has the "authority to represent [a] unified human 
history" (p. 13). Clifford's (1986a) work marks a general awareness that the 
ethnographer can no longer suppress the literary aspect of ethnography through 
recourse to the "transparency of representation and immediacy of experience" (p. 2). 
While a number of prominent ethnographers, including Malinowski, Clifford 
Geertz, Mary Douglas and Levi-Strauss to name a few, have admitted to being 
influenced by the literary realm, Clifford asserts that up until recently literary 
influences have been marginalised and suppressed within an ethnographic discipline 
which sees itself as being rigorously scientific (p. 3). Since the seventeenth century, 
he argues, Western science, in constructing itself as factual and objective, has 
actively sought to exclude literary forms of knowledge from the scientific arena. 
Fiction, representing an unstable, polysemous discourse was deemed the 
epistemological antithesis of a scientific knowledge predicated on the univocality of 
Truth and Reason. 
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In his mapping out of the processes whereby ethnography became characterised 
as a 'science' in the twentieth century, Clifford argues that this was partly due to a 
calculated suppression of the fictionalising processes inherent in ethnographic work 
and a subsequent alignment with the perceived mono logic authority of rationalism. 
From 1900 to 1960, the process of ethnography became professionalised with 
"intensive fieldwork, pursued by university trained specialists, [ emerging] as a 
privileged, sanctioned source of data about exotic peoples" (Clifford, 1983, p. 120). 
Prior to this the ethnographer could not claim any particular authority over the 
process of cultural interpretation. There was nothing to guarantee the legitimacy of 
the ethnographer's interpretation over that of the traveller or missionary. However, 
with the gradual emergence of the fieldworker as a professional whose authority was 
"both scientifically validated and based on a unique personal experience" (p. 121 ), 
the work of amateurs in the field was subordinated to that of the new fieldworker. 
Prior to the late nineteenth century Clifford argues that the boundary between 
the ethnographer and the anthropologist was able to be kept quite distinct. However, 
the emergence of the professional ethnographic fieldworker witnessed a blurring of 
the roles of interpreter/translator versus anthropologist/scientist. For example, the 
work of the famous ethnographer Malinowski demonstrates a constant anxiety vis a 
vis "the rhetorical problem of convincing his readers that the facts he was putting 
before them were objectively acquired, not subjective creations" (p. 123). While 
ethnography may have sought to align itself with scientific rationalism, the dominant 
cultural discourse of the time, the interpretive or literary aspects of the ethnographic 
process were still very much in evidence. Ethnography became at once a scientific 
and literary genre, "a synthetic cultural description based on participant-
observation" (p. 124 ). 
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Given the obvious tensions between promoting ethnography as a science while 
attempting to conceal the literary or 'subjective' processes involved in cultural 
description, it was necessary to construct and legitimise certain institutional and 
methodological practices in order to validate an ethnography based on scientific 
participant-observation. This included validating "the persona of the fieldworker [ as 
a scientific expert with access to] the latest analytic techniques and modes of 
scientific explanation" (p. 124). Like Rorty's Philosopher, the professional 
fieldworker was, according to Clifford, promoted as having privileged access to an 
objective, scientific realm that enabled him/her to "get to the heart of a culture more 
quickly, grasping its essential institutions and structures" (p. 124). Out of this 
'scientisation' of ethnography emerged a privileged set of nonnative standards 
governing and policing the bounds of valid scientific research in a systematised 
fashion. 
According to Clifford, in order to further legitimise the authority of the 
ethnographer the academy placed increasing importance on "the power of 
observation" (p. 125). This was accompanied, he argues, by the institutionalisation 
of an objectified, static notion of culture "as an ensemble of characteristic 
behaviours, ceremonies and gestures, susceptible to recording and explanation by a 
trained onlooker" (p. 125). The primacy allocated to visualism validated the role of 
the ethnographer as a distanced, detached observer able to accurately map the 
objective structures of a culture. Utilising reason as a legislative tool, the inter-
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subjective, interpretive processes of ethnography were effectively suppressed within 
an empirical ethnographic model that privileged 'objective' forms of knowledge. 
These legitimating strategies came together in the body of the ethnographic text 
itself where certain textual or rhetorical modes were employed to denote the 
objective, scientific nature of the ethnographer's claims. In particular, textual 
realism, a representational mode that tends to conceal its own 'constructed' nature, 
served the purposes of a modern ethnography concerned with privileging the 
authority of scientific discourse. 
From Rationalism to Hermeneutics: The Shifting Ground of Ethnographic 
Authority 
The participant-observation model privileged in ethnography can be seen as 
paradoxically representing a kind of epistemological dialectic of experience versus 
interpretation where the emphasis on either term depends on the type of 
authoritative claim being made. The traditional scientific mode around which 
ethnography constructed its authority depended on privileging the experience of the 
ethnographer. While the notion of experience suggests non-scientific, subjective 
processes that appear to contradict the concept of participant-observation as a 
science, the traditional ethnographic construction of experience as a "unifying 
source of authority" (Clifford, 1983, p. 128) depends upon an underlying belief that 
one can translate the chaotic experiential realm into a stable, coherent representation 
reflected in the form of a realist text. In this objectivist approach to representation 
and the acquisition of cultural knowledge, the mystification of the process of 
translation further serves to add to the authoritative aura of the ethnographer as 
fieldworker. 
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However, like Bauman, Clifford contends that in recent years there has been a 
shift towards focusing on the interpretive aspects of this dialectic model (p. 127). 
Clifford posits a general scepticism towards experiential claims to authority. This 
has been accompanied, he argues, by an attempt to make visible "what had 
previously passed unexamined in the construction of ethnographic narratives" (p. 
130). In contrast to the kind of empirical assumptions underpinning experiential 
modes of authority, the interpretive anthropologist posits that "a world cannot be 
appr~hended directly" (p. 131) but instead is always already present in a textualised 
form. Viewing "culture as an assemblage of texts to be interpreted" (p. 130), the 
interpretive ethnographer aims to demystify the processes of cultural "invention" in 
which all ethnographers are engaged. 
However, Clifford is critical of interpretive anthropologists like Geertz, who, 
while perceiving culture in textual terms, tend to render invisible the dialogic nature 
of culture and their own authorial role in suppressing that dialogue (p. 132). While 
Clifford acknowledges the role that interpretive ethnography has played in 
problematising ethnographic authority, he argues that it is still dependant largely on 
realist modes of representation that continue to position the ethnographer as 
knowing subject while reducing the contribution of the 'native' informant to that of 
cultural object. 
Clifford argues that the Geertzian interpretive mode is in the process of being 
replaced by discursive or dialogic models of ethnographic practice that disrupt the 
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monologic textual authority of the ethnographer. These latter models of 
ethnography are centrally concerned with what happens when the discursive 
research experience is translated "into a textual corpus separate from its discursive 
occasions of production" (p. 131 ). Clifford suggests that the translation process 
involves filtering out "the actuality of discursive situations and individual 
interlocutors ... [ in order to locate] the unruly meanings of a text in a single, 
coherent intention" (p. 132). However, in a discursive model of knowledge, 
meaning is seen as being produced intersubjectively, in a specific, communicational 
setting. According to Clifford, the ethnographer cannot read or interpret culture as 
an "abstracted, textualised reality" (p. 133) but, instead, is forced to engage in a 
dialogic process where meaning is shared, constructed and negotiated with one or 
more 'informants'. The final ethnographic product is not so much an authorised 
monologue as a heteroglossic text "shot through with other subjectivities and 
specific contextual overtones" (p. 133). 
Clifford argues that we have recently witnessed the emergence of some concrete 
examples of this new mode of ethnography, a mode he characterises as a "discursive 
paradigm of ethnographic writing" (p. 134 ). In these experimental ethnographic 
works the writer is concerned with foregrounding the "circumstantial and 
intersubjective" (p. 134) elements normally suppressed in the process of textual 
construction. In several of the works Clifford discusses, the text is presented as an 
actual dialogue in order to reveal the collaborative nature of ethnographic work. As 
he points out, however, such textual strategies are still no more than 
"representations of dialogue" (p. 134). While the ethnographer may be portrayed as 
a mere participant in a cultural conversation, such a representation may still leave 
intact the "mono logical authority" of the ethnographer (p. 135). 
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It seems that the dialogic representation of ethnographic work still reduces and 
simplifies what Clifford sees as the "complex, multi-vocal processes" (p. 135) 
invoked in any anthropological encounter. For Clifford, a more useful way to 
problematise the notion of a mono logic ethnographic authority is to introduce into 
the structure of the ethnographic text itself the concept of "research as an ongoing 
negotiation" (p. 135). This involves rendering transparent those research processes 
normally hidden in the background of the ethnographic text. He notes that this 
move is not a completely new one. Paradoxically, prior to the institutionalisation of 
the "modem, authoritative monograph" (p. 136) as the valid form of ethnographic 
representation, many ethnographic texts were more complex and open to multiple 
readings than their modem counterparts. Given that the modem, ethnographic 
mode, with its emphasis on the experiential authority of the ethnographer, was still 
in its infancy, these early ethnographic texts often revealed themselves to be 
constructed not only by the ethnographer but also by multiple indigenous "authors" 
(p. 136). According to this reading, it seems, these texts were prototypical 
discursive ethnographies. Unlike the modem monograph, they allowed for the 
possibility of a multivocal rather than a mono logically-based authority. 
Clifford's analysis of the changing face of ethnographic authority illustrates the 
restrictive and repressive nature of privileging particular discourses, in the case of 
modem ethnography that of scientific rationalism, in the process of constructing 
intellectual authority. Like Rorty, Clifford sees this tendency to adhere to pre-
conceived epistemological frameworks or textual prescriptions as limiting the 
pluralist possibilities of intellectual inquiry. In Clifford's new conception of 
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ethnography the intellectual' s authority derives from a commitment to pluralism and 
cultural dialogue rather than relying upon legislative approaches to knowledge. 
Ethnography as Conversation: the Dialogic Cultural Text 
Clifford is also sceptical of the ethnographer' s ability to represent a postmodern 
contemporary culture of increasing complexity and diversity. Like Bauman, 
Clifford (1986b) argues that we have entered a new "postcultural" age characterised 
by a general "condition of uncertainty" (p. 143). In Clifford's version of 
postmodemism, he contends that 'reality' has changed fundamentally. While we 
were_ once able to refer to stable cultures and identities, our current "urban, 
multinational world of institutionalised transience" represents a new, postmodern 
environment where the stable signs of Western culture now appear as "achieved 
fictions, containing and domesticating heteroglossia" (p. 143). Doubt has been cast, 
then, on the legitimacy of modem ethnographic practices as the "ambiguous" and 
"multi-vocal" nature of the contemporary world "makes it increasingly hard to 
conceive of human diversity as inscribed in bounded, independent cultures" 
(Clifford, 1983, p. 119). 
For Clifford (1986a), traditional approaches to representation provide 
inadequate interpretive models for a contemporary world that demands "new forms 
of inventiveness and subtlety from a fully reflexive ethnography" (p. 23 ). The static 
notion of culture that has served as an explanatory model for ethnographic research 
is becoming increasingly obsolete. Instead of adhering to rigid, totalising theories of 
culture, the indetenninacy of the 'present' calls for a complete revision of modem 
ethnography. Clifford's postmodern ethnographer is no longer able to refer to the 
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meta-narratives of certainty that underpin such totalising theories of culture in order 
to authorise his/her position. Any claims to authority that the postmodern 
ethnographer might make must acknowledge the limitations and impossibilities of 
representation. Without recourse to the Cartesian fundamentals of reason and truth, 
the postmodern ethnographer stands on shifting epistemological ground so that the 
process of theorising becomes one of responding to the "current, changing 
situation ... (with) interventions rather than positions" (p. 24). 
Clifford (1983) is interested in investigating the "new methods and 
epistemologies" (p. 119) that have emerged from postmodern critiques of traditional 
approaches to representation and that offer more fluid, shifting conceptions of 
culture. According to Clifford, a revised ethnographic project must look to the 
literary arena for new ways to approach the construction of cultural knowledge and 
identity. However, like Rorty, he is at pains to point out that while such alternative 
approaches to knowledge may help us construct less static, ahistorical images of 
each other and of the cultures from which we emerge, "no sovereign scientific 
method or ethical stance can guarantee the truth of such images" (p. 119). 
Nevertheless, Clifford views the textual realm as offering ethnography new, 
liberatory possibilities in terms of not only interpreting an increasingly complex 
sociocultural environment but also in relation to allowing the voice of cultural 
'others' to be given recognition in the ethnographic process. Clifford calls upon 
Bakhtin's notion of the polyphonic novel as "a utopian textual space where 
discursive complexity, the dialogical interplay of voices, can be accommodated" (p. 
137) in order to illustrate the alternative textual approaches available to the 
ethnographer concerned with problematising textual authority. 
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The predominant and traditional narrative mode in ethnography, Clifford 
argues, resembles the "free indirect style [ associated, for example, with the writing 
of Flaubert], a style that suppresses direct quotation in favour of a controlling 
discourse always more-or-less that of the author" (p. 137). In contrast, for Bakhtin 
the ideal novelist resists the temptation to produce a controlled, coherent text, 
constructing instead a more multivocal work that "grapples with, and enacts, 
heteroglossia" (p. 136). While Clifford notes that most ethnographers tend to aspire 
to the kind of "Flaubertian omniscience" that enables them to view the culture of the 
other from a distanced, objective position, "beneath the surface their texts are more 
unruly and discordant", suggesting the possibility of Bakhtinian polyphony (p. 137). 
The Bakhtinian ideal of the polyphonic novel is still, for Clifford, limited in its 
pluralist possibilities given that the novel is always, in the end, constructed by a 
single author. In contrast, Clifford points out that the process of ethnography is 
inevitably "invaded by heteroglossia" (p. 139) given that ethnographic discourse 
claims to represent the experiences of specific real, rather than fictionalised, 
individuals. 
The realisation that the ethnographic text is always multivocal leads Clifford to 
posit "an alternative textual strategy" where the notion of polyphony is translated 
into a concrete recognition of the collaborative nature of the text (p. 140). In such a 
format the status of the informants would move from that of "independent 
enunciators ... to writers" (p. 140). As Clifford admits, such a dream of plural 
authorship is a utopian one given that the ethnographic process is determined by 
"the research interest of the ethnographer, who in the end assumes an executive, 
editorial position [thus inevitably reinscribing] the authoritative stance of 'giving 
57 
voice' to the other" (p. 140). It seems that while we can strive to problematise the 
ethnographer' s authority and offer alternative strategies that encourage dialogic 
readings of the text, all modes of representation are inevitably caught up in problems 
of authority. The object must be to foreground rather than attempt to conceal 
different modes of authority and to admit that the goal of "coherent presentation" is 
never innocent but instead is always "a matter of strategic choice" (p. 142). 
The kind of authorial self-reflexivity that Clifford (1986a) is advocating here 
depends on accepting that literary practices cannot be extracted from the empirical 
process and "marked off in an aesthetic, creative or humanising domain" (p. 6). 
Rather, if ethnographers accept that cultural representations are always partial and 
exclusionary then the fictionality of ethnographic writing must be emphasised and 
moreover embraced. This self-reflexive approach is, for Clifford, an important 
aspect of a revisionist ethnography whose goal is to disperse ethnographic authority. 
He suggests that by self-consciously utilising the process of textual fabrication to 
convey to the reader the incomplete and contested nature of ethnographic truth, the 
ethnographer can use this open admission of partiality as a "source of 
representational tact" (p. 7). For example, in the collected documents of James 
Walker's work with the Teton Sioux the documentation has been "edited in a 
manner that gives equal weight to diverse renditions of tradition [so that] Walker's 
own descriptions and glosses are fragments among fragments" (p. 15) carrying no 
particular authorial weight or privilege while the "informants" become, in effect, co-
authors. 
Clifford thus urges the ethnographer to avoid reducing cultural accounts to a 
falsely coherent whole. Like the surrealist artist who seeks to defamiliarise 
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conventional notions of reality rather than rendering the real comprehensible, the 
ethnographer as fabricator must learn to construct fragmented rather than unified 
texts. Instead of relying on scientific rhetoric in order to disguise the constructed 
nature of the ethnographic text, the work should resemble the surrealist collage with 
"the cuts and sutures of the research process left visible" (Clifford, 1981, p. 563). 
Clifford's ethnographer has thus moved away from an explanatory model of 
representation to a more experimental mode of textual construction where the goal 
becomes to render visible, rather than to suppress, the 'otherness' within the text. 
Clifford's 'ethnographic surrealism' resonates with Bauman's metanarrative 
that 'Ye are moving from an age of certainty to a postmodern era characterised by 
ambivalence. Clifford's ethnographer is no longer concerned with fabricating 
coherent representational models or with imposing a textualised order on to an 
increasingly complex and ambiguous social world. Instead, the surrealist 
ethnographer celebrates strangeness, "provoking the irruption of otherness - the 
unexpected", thereby problematising and defamiliarising an ethnographic humanism 
that "begins with the different and renders it (through naming, classifying, 
describing, interpreting) comprehensible" (p. 562). 
From Visualism to Performance 
Clifford's (1986a) generalised critique of the tendency of modem ethnography 
to legislate against difference emerges in another form in what he summarises as a 
rejection of "visualism" (p. 11) within ethnography. Clifford contends that the 
participant-observation model that has provided the methodological basis of 
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ethnographic work privileges the "truth of vision" over the evidences of other senses 
such as sound and smell (p. 11). Such a privileging of visual models of reality has 
led to a tendency to see the anthropologist as observing and thereby objectifying 
culture from a distanced standpoint. The notion that one can comprehend culture 
visually implies what is for Clifford, following Foucault (1979), a problematic 
conception of the process of acquiring cultural knowledge. Utilising the visualist 
model, the Western scholar perceives cultural knowledge as a set of facts that can be 
"observed, rather than, for example, heard, invented in dialogue, or transcribed" 
(Clifford, 1986a, p. 12). Clifford contends that this model "confer[s] on the other a 
discrete identity, while also providing the knowing observer with a standpoint from 
whic!l to see without being seen, to read without interruption" (p. 12). 
Visualism can thus be seen as an epistemological embodiment of the 
hierarchical relationship arising between the modem ethnographer and the cultural 
'informant', where ethnographic authority over the representation of the 'other' 
depends on privileging the Western ethnographic gaze. In order to topple visualism 
from its privileged position in cultural discourse, Clifford suggests replacing such 
objectifying models with more discursively aware models that aim to capture "an 
interplay of voices" (p. 12) rather than reducing culture to a flat, one dimensional 
text. In constructing texts that move towards the multivocality of dialogue rather 
than the univocality of the aforementioned visual paradigm, Clifford hopes to 
legitimate the ''performative [my emphasis] elements of ethnography" (p. 12). 
When knowledge production is viewed in a perfonnative sense "the dominant 
metaphors for ethnography shift away from the observing eye and toward expressive 
speech ( and gesture)" (p. 12 ). If cultural knowledge is seen as being generated in 
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specific speech acts it becomes apparent that ethnographic texts tell the reader less 
about the cultural 'object' encountered by the ethnographer than they do about the 
complex interactions and negotiations of meaning occurring between the 
ethnographer and his/her 'informants'; that is, the 'actors' in the text. The implied 
separation between the subject and the object, self and other, that underpins the 
traditional participant-observation model becomes problematised. Instead of 
viewing the text as a static cultural representation controlled by the ethnographer, 
Clifford encourages us to see ethnography "as a performance emplotted by powerful 
stories"(p. 98). 
l;'he notion that the ethnographic text is a performative, intercultural arena 
implies a dispersal of Western ethnographic authority. This emphasis on the 
interactive process of meaning construction results in "transforming the "cultural 
text" ... into a speaking subject, who sees as well as is seen, who evades, argues, 
probes back" (p. 14), thus empowering the cultural 'other' normally silenced or 
marginalised in the ethnographic text. Clifford contends that for the truly 'self-
reflexive' ethnographic writer it becomes impossible to construct a coherent 
narrative from an objective, distanced standpoint. Once the ethnographer recognises 
his/her own participation in a cultural exchange of knowledge and meaning then 
inevitably "difference invades the text; it can no longer be represented; it must be 
enacted [ my emphasis]" (p. 104 ). 
While Clifford does not advocate any particular textual strategy or model of 
knowledge as the epistemological solution to problems of ethnographic authority, I 
have chosen to focus on his performative model of knowledge because it illustrates 
especially well Bauman' s theory that the postmodern intellectual is moving towards 
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anti-legislative forms of knowledge. Clifford's conception of ethnography as a 
performative, intersubjective process implies a more democratic, anti-disciplinary 
approach to knowledge. He notes that with the demise of intellectual authority one 
can no longer justify imperialist attempts to map the 'other' from some privileged, 
extra-cultural standpoint. He embraces the possibilities offered by this apparent 
rupture of hierarchies of knowledge advocating a dissolution of the artificial 
disciplinary boundaries separating ethnography as a profession from the realm of art 
and literature. For Clifford (1983), then, as we enter a postmodern post-disciplinary 
age "it has become necessary to imagine a world of generalised ethnography" (p. 
119). 
Writing Ethnography: The Limitations of Textualism 
Clifford's work on ethnographic authority arises out of a more general concern 
within the humanities about the politics and problematics of representation. As 
evidenced by the textualist influence apparent in Clifford's writings, ethnography's 
encounter with literary criticism has contributed in a major way to the current 
scepticism shown towards ethnography's claims to cultural authority. There is no 
doubt that this literary 'tum' within ethnography has helped to politicise issues of 
cross-cultural representation and has encouraged ethnography to tum its gaze upon 
its own 'culture'. Textualists like Clifford, through dissecting ethnographic texts 
and revealing textual strategies of domination hidden behind a rhetoric of scientific 
objectivity, have contributed to undermining the myth of authorial neutrality. 
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Clifford's work, underpinned as it is by an implicit endorsement of pluralism 
and difference, represents one version ofBaurnan's interpretive tum. Clifford is an 
example of a theorist who has turned towards the text as a way to resolve problems 
of authority. However, the limitations of textualism for such a project become 
apparent in some of the literary solutions that Clifford offers. His handling of the 
issue of partiality illustrates this problematic. While Clifford (1983) contends that 
the ethnographer can never shed his/her own cultural influences in order to 
accurately represent another culture, he contradicts this admission of partiality by 
suggesting that it is possible for the ethnographer utilising a dialogic cultural model 
to "resist the pull toward authoritative representation of the other" (p. 135). Such a 
state])lent suggests the possibility of discovering better representational models, that 
are able to represent the world more accurately, rather than reflecting a desire to 
move beyond conventional modes of representation. While the open admission of 
partiality that characterises the self-reflexive text is a useful strategy in the research 
setting for making apparent the power-laden nature of socio-cultural inquiry, such an 
admission does not automatically confer some kind of neutrality on the researcher. 
Cultural description is always politicised and partial whether one constructs the 
ethnographic text in a self-reflexive or a realist mode. 
Clifford, in being unable to accept the partial and limited nature of all 
knowledge, including that of the textualist ethnographer, offers a problematic 
solution to Bauman's anti-legislative project. Clifford's tendency to privilege 
textual analysis over other approaches poses a problem for the interpretive focus 
advocated by Bauman where the emphasis is on the way that 'life worlds' are 
constituted in a plural manner. By subsuming the complexities and contradictions of 
the socio-cultural realm "into a reified, formalist notion of literature ( or textuality )" 
(Reed, 1992, p. 146), Clifford"s work represents a somewhat limited and 
exclusionary approach to the legislative/interpretive debate. 
63 
In making these criticisms I am not suggesting that Clifford is unaware of these 
issues. Rather, I wish to highlight some of the limitations of looking for literary 
solutions to problems of authority. There are dangers in privileging literary 
discourse, not the least of which is the tendency to presume that the text somehow 
contains an inherent liberatory promise of dialogue unfettered by power relations or 
difference. While Clifford admittedly points out that the ethnographic text is always 
constructed within a particular set of institutional, social and power relations, like 
many textualists he tends to conflate issues of authorial control within the text with 
wider issues of disciplinary and cultural authority. I will return to some of these 
issues in my next chapter when I discuss Patti Lather's attempt to use a performative 
model of knowledge in order to construct research strategies that empower the 
'informant'. While Lather moves beyond the purely theoretical writings of Rorty 
and Clifford in striving to apply interpretive approaches to knowledge to actual 
empirical work, I show that her 'post-positivist' claims are rather premature and 
again offer a rather problematic resolution to Baurnan's legislative crisis. 
IV 
DEJ\10CRATISING KNOWLEDGE: 
EMPIRICISM IN A POSTPOSITIVIST ERA 
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Like Rorty and Clifford, the work of Patti Lather, a feminist theorist in 
education, can be seen as arising out of and contributing to the 'interpretive' turn I 
have been mapping out in this thesis. Lather's focus on developing empowering 
research methodologies and her concern with research as praxis reflects a critical 
stance towards positivist claims to objectivity and neutrality. While her explicitly 
feminist-socialist political agenda seems to have little in common with Rorty's 
pragmatic affirmation of bourgeois liberalism, she shares with both Rorty and 
Clifford a scepticism towards grand theories of knowledge which legislate the 
conditions under which knowledge is generated and validated. Like Bauman, Lather 
(198~) posits that we are moving from an era of certainty characterised by a "lust for 
absolutes" (p. 570) to a postpositivist era "premised on the essential indeterminacy 
of human experiencing" (p. 569). She asserts that there is an increasing awareness 
of the obsolescence of positivism as "the orthodox paradigm for inquiry in the 
human sciences" (1986a, p. 63). 
This growing awareness of the limitations of positivism has resulted, Lather 
claims, in "a rich ferment in contemporary discourse regarding empirical research in 
the human sciences" (p. 63). In the wake of this debate about positivism, Lather 
( 1986b) sees the possibility of a new postpositivist approach to research where the 
methodological slate has been wiped clean "of prescribed rules and boundaries ... 
[ allowing the] ... search for different possibilities of making sense of human life" (p. 
259). Lather hopes to take advantage of the current experience of epistemological 
uncertainty in order to totally reconceptualise the process of producing social 
knowledge. 
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In this chapter I discuss some of the alternative empirical models proposed by 
Lather, focusing in particular on her reconceptualisation of validity in a research 
setting centrally concerned with social justice. I trace Lather's theoretical 
progression from her earlier adherence to feminist materialism, a position generally 
informed by a belief in an empirical reality and in structural fonns of oppression, to 
her more recent encounter with poststructuralism, a mode of inquiry that suggests, at 
the very least, some kind of problematisation of the notion of a given social 'reality'. 
As a means of problematising critical theory's postpositivist claims, I point out the 
surprising similarities between Lather's poststructuralist approach to research and 
her more 'grounded' materialist focus on methodology. Given these similarities, I 
suggest that we need to examine more closely the claim that 
postmodern/poststructuralist theories have moved beyond modernist concerns. 
Finally, I explore the possibility that poststructuralist approaches to research are still 
caught up in a search for transcendent forms of knowledge and with policing the 
bounds of social inquiry. In order to frame this discussion of Lather's purportedly 
postpositivist research models, I will briefly outline her critique of positivism and 
her discussion of the merits of postpositivism/postmodernism. 
Postpositivism and the Politics of Social Inquiry 
Lather (1989) argues that "the relation of politics and social inquiry" (p. 1) has 
recently come under intense scrutiny from a number of quarters. While feminist, 
neo-marxist and minority theorists have sought for some time to politicise the realm 
of social description, for Lather it is the complex and multiple discourses of 
postmodernism/poststructuralism that have acted as the final catalyst in effecting "a 
fundamental turning point in social thought" (p. 2). This turning point involves a 
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paradigmatic shift away from traditional notions of interest-free knowledge towards 
a conception of knowledge as "contested and partial. .. [ and] shaped by the interplay 
of language, power and meaning" (p. 2). 
Given the increasing politicisation of knowledge production and "the growing 
acknowledgment of the ways that values permeate what we do in the name of 
science" (p. 11), Lather (1986a) contends that positivism's privileged position as 
"the orthodox approach to doing empirical research in the human sciences" (p. 63) 
is under siege. While Lather (1989) admits that positivism still dominates the 
methodological scene, she argues that its hegemony over research practice is being 
serio~sly challenged by an "array of alternative ways of knowing" (p. 12). Those 
discourses once marginalised within the social sciences such as feminist and Freirian 
participatory research models are gaining recognition as alternative ways of knowing 
able to compete for legitimacy with the 'neutral' sciences (p. 12). 
Pivotal to this dispersal of positivist authority is the claim that that the goals of 
objectivity and neutrality that underpin traditional approaches to research are 
impossible to achieve. The proponents of "openly ideological" research argue that 
research based on notions such as scientific neutrality does not provide us with more 
objective data but instead only serves "to mystify the inherently ideological nature of 
research in the human sciences" (1986a, p. 64). Post-positivist research, then, is 
premised on a conception of knowledge that differs markedly from traditional 
notions. Instead of attempting to access some transcendent and external set of 
meanings, the post-positivist views knowledge production as "inherently culture-
bound and perspectival" (1991, p. 2). 
Lather, drawing upon Gramsci's contention that "ideology is the medium 
through which consciousness and meaningfulness operate in everyday life" (p. 2), 
argues that research must self-consciously acknowledge the necessarily ideological 
nature of knowledge production rather than trying to conceal the network of social 
and power relations in which all research processes occur. Here the notion of 
ideology that Lather adheres to represents more than the repressive mechanism 
associated with traditional Marxist notions of false consciousness. Instead, Lather 
(quoting Sandra Harding) makes a distinction between "coercive values ... [such as] 
racism ... that deteriorate objectivity ... [and] participatory values ... [such as] anti-
racism ... that decrease distortions and mystifications in our culture's explanations 
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and understandings" (p. 3). The inference here is that advocacy approaches to social 
inquiry based upon participat01y values may offer the possibility of producing less 
distorted data. Thus, out of this conception of knowledge production as 
"historically situated and structurally located" (p. 2) emerges a radical form of 
intellectual scholarship that establishes its credibility as a legitimate empirical 
discourse through acknowledging its own biases. 
Lather urges scholars to exploit the possibilities opened up by the breakdown of 
positivist hegemony in order to construct a new critical social science that openly 
identifies with oppositional social movements. Such an approach to social inquiry, 
Lather argues, would produce research that is less concerned with developing a 
priori theories than with fonnulating pragmatic "critical practices [that] derive their 
forms and meanings in relation to their changing historical conditions" (p. 3). Such 
critical research derives its empirical authority, then, from being 'grounded' by a 
specific socio-political transformative agenda rather than relying on some 
monolithic, imposed social theory. 
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Research as Praxis 
While the emergence of post-positivist discourses has been accompanied by a 
general reconceptualisation of theories of knowledge, Lather (1991) argues that 
there has been less impact in the area of methodology. She suggests that a critical 
social science concerned with the politics of emancipation must possess a parallel 
concern with developing research strategies that "empower those involved to change 
as well as understand the world" (p. 3). Here Lather utilises Gramsci's conception 
of empowerment which necessitates the analysis of "the causes of powerlessness, 
recognising systematic oppressive forces, and acting both individually and 
collectively to change the conditions of our lives" (p. 4 ). 
Translating the politics of empowennent into practice requires a change in the 
focus of research from a concern with merely generating data about structural 
oppression to a more praxis-oriented social inquiry. For Lather (1986b ), the notion 
of praxis as "the dialectical tension, the interactive, reciprocal shaping of theory and 
practice" (p. 258) is central to an emancipatory social science. However, she points 
out that despite the vigorous debate engendered by critical theory, a significant gap 
exists between emancipatory theoretical claims and the actuality of empirical 
research. 
According to Lather, the radical possibilities of empirical research have been 
limited by a tendency towards imposing somewhat instrumental, overdetermined 
theories onto the research process. This imposition of a priori concepts onto the 
specificities of empirical data "leads to a circle where theory is reinforced by 
experience conditioned by theory" (p. 261 ). In order to combat theoretical 
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determinism, Lather suggests that theory needs to be flexible, open and responsive to 
"the experiences of people in their daily lives" (p. 261). Following on from 
Garfinkel's (1967) work on ethnomethodology, Lather is critical ofresearchers who 
view themselves as possessing privileged insights into the world while reducing the 
status of their informants to that of 'dupes' of false consciousness. 
Central to Lather's (1986b) conception of emancipatory, empirical research, 
then, is a commitment to a dialectical approach to theory building that is "premised 
on a deep respect for the intellectual and political capacities of the dispossessed" (p. 
262). Such a view is tempered by the realisation that "lived experience in an 
unequal society too often lacks an awareness of the need to struggle against 
privilege" (p. 262). In developing theories of emancipation, a balance must be 
obtained between recognising the social agency involved in lived experience and 
between reflecting at a theoretical level the wider social structures "that shape 
human experience and perceptions" (p. 262). 
Critical social theory is concerned with exploring the intersection between 
human agency and structural constraint at a theoretical level and with emphasising 
the importance of "empowering pedagogy [as] an essential step in social 
transformation" (p. 263). However, these theoretical insights are yet to be carried 
over into research practice itself. For Lather, researchers concerned with the quest 
for empowerment need to rethink the goals of empirical research. Once the central 
focus of research shifts from a concern with obtaining better data to a concern with 
research as praxis, the relationship between the researcher and the researched ( as in 
Clifford's postmodern ethnography) takes on a whole new meaning. The key word 
that characterises this change is reciprocity; described by Lather as "a mutual 
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negotiation of meaning and power... [ operating at]. .. the juncture between researcher 
and researched and between data and theory" (p. 263). 
Lather gives concrete examples of studies that have attempted to include a 
degree of reciprocity between the researcher and the participants into the structure 
of their research designs. In one such study the researcher introduced reciprocity 
into the research process by holding one-to-one and group discussions in order to 
develop participants' views (p. 264). The researcher sought to "democratise" the 
research process by producing " an agreed-upon account of the views of the 
participants" (p. 262) that was coauthored and negotiated by the participants 
them.selves. However, Lather is critical of this research for being only partially 
reciprocal. She points out that since reciprocity was not extended to the later stages 
of the research process the issue of false consciousness was not addressed. In a fully 
reciprocal research project strategies would be employed "to distinguish between 
people's reasoned rejections of interpretations and theoretical arguments and false 
consciousness" (p. 265). 
After examining a number of empowering research methodologies Lather 
concludes that despite the emancipatory concerns of praxis-oriented work 
researchers still tend to treat participants as objects or sources of data rather than as 
active agents capable of collaborating with the researcher in negotiating and 
constructing social meaning. The latter conception of the informant's role invites a 
truly dialectic and interactive approach to research in order to guard against the twin 
dangers of "top-down impositional practices" in terms of constructing theories of 
emancipation and the reification of lived experience and participants' common-
sense ways of viewing the world (p. 265). 
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Similarly, Lather emphasises the need for developing a reciprocal relationship 
between data and theory. For Lather, emancipatory theory serves a catalytic role in 
terms of social activism when it resonates "with people's lived concerns, fears, and 
aspirations" (p. 267). Rather than imposing universalist, reductive theories onto a 
complex and indeterminate world, a dialectic approach to theory-building works by 
"increasing specificity at the contextual level in order to see how larger issues are 
embedded in the particulars of everyday life" (p. 267). Such a stance requires theory 
to be flexible and open to counter-interpretations. This dialectical model counters 
the notion often implicit in emancipatory research, such as neo-Marxist 
ethnography, that "conceptual validity precedes empirical accuracy" (p. 267). 
Instec:J,d, the more self-reflexive approach advocated by Lather involves empirical 
evidence being "viewed as a mediator in a constant mutual interrogation between 
self and theory" (p. 267). 
The Problem of Validity 
For Lather, self-reflexivity is not only essential to democratising the research 
process, it is also important for establishing the validity of social data. While the 
positivist obsession with producing quantifiable, value-free data has been shown to 
be a futile one, she argues that the goal of producing credible data cannot be 
discarded. As Lather (1986a) points out "with no ready-made formulae to guarantee 
valid social knowledge" (p. 66) it is doubly important for praxis-oriented researchers 
to develop systematic ways of establishing the validity of data. In order to produce 
social knowledge that has utility for an emancipatory political project, research must 
be rigorous as well as relevant (p. 67). Lather is concerned that praxis-oriented 
research guard itself from the accusations of"rampant subjectivity" often aimed at 
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more phenomenologically based paradigms (p. 68). She proposes that researchers 
"formulate self-corrective techniques that will check the credibility of our data and 
minimise the distorting effect of personal bias upon the logic of evidence" (p. 65). 
In conventional positivist research validity is established through obeying 
certain preset systematised rules in order to produce quantifiable data. Data 
trustworthiness focuses on whether data is measurable and reproducible and depends 
on the apparent elimination of the qualitative or subjective elements present in the 
research process. Emphasis is placed on statistical "manipulations" that strengthen 
the appearance of objectivity rather than the reciprocal grounding of theory in 
empirical data. Paradoxically, such positivist approaches to the problem of data 
reliability merely produces "consistent subjectivity" (p. 66). As Lather points out, 
viewing the empirical world as a direct source of objective facts "results in the 
reification of constructs that are the projections of social biases, masculinity-
femininity being but one prime example" (p. 66). 
According to Lather, the recognition of the limitations of positivist attempts to 
produce objective, reliable data by extracting subjective knowledge from the process 
of theorising is "leading to the reconceptualisation of validity" (p. 66). 
Postpositivists wanting to move beyond the bounds of "naive empiricism" are 
increasingly viewing inquiry "as a process whereby tacit (subjective) knowledge and 
propositional (objective) knowledge are interwoven and mutually informing" 
(1986b, p. 270). Given that there are no specific rules or procedures that one can 
follow in order to ensure data reliability, Lather suggests that we need to construct 
research designs that incorporate self-reflexivity systematically into the fabric of the 
research process. 
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Lather refers to a number of praxis-oriented theorists who suggest borrowing 
validating techniques from traditional research and modifying them to suit the 
interactive dialogic needs of empowering research methodologies. These theorists 
suggest that a system of methodological checks parallelling the "major principles of 
orthodox rigour" needs to be put in place in order to ensure that the process of social 
inquiry can be seen as "objectively subjective" (p. 270). Developing this theme, 
Lather offers a set of suggested research strategies that will assist the researcher in 
putting into practice a reconceptualised model of validity. 
Firstly, Lather's utilisation of the standard sociological research technique of 
triangulation goes beyond the positivist concern with multiple measures to a focus 
on the need for multiple sources of data, method and theories. For data to be 
credible the research design needs to be able to acknowledge "counterpattems" and 
contradictions as well as predicted patterns (p. 270). 
Secondly, construct validity involves acknowledging the consciously 
constructed nature of theory-building in empirical work. However, this process 
needs to include more than just a self-reflexive focus on the researcher's own 
theoretical preconceptions. It must also involve a continual process of referring 
back to the lived experiences of the research informants in order to guard against 
theoretical imposition. If praxis-oriented research is going to produce relevant 
emancipatory social theory, Lather contends that a "systematised reflexivity, which 
reveals how a priori theory has been changed by the logic of the data, becomes 
essential in establishing construct validity" (p. 271 ). 
Thirdly,face validity, dealt with at the most basic level by carrying out 
"member checks" (where the validity of analysis is vetted by recycling data back 
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through a sample of respondents), is integral to the process of democratising 
knowledge as well as establishing data credibility (p. 271). Face validity is a 
complex notion that overlaps considerably with construct validity. According to 
Lather, it is an underestimated strategy that needs to become a standard part of 
emancipatory research designs. However, she warns the researcher that there are 
limits to the utility of face validity in terms of establishing data credibility given that 
member checks are always complicated by the problematic but very real issue of 
false consciousness. Her advice to praxis oriented researchers is that they view the 
strategy of face validity as "a necessary but not sufficient approach to establishing 
data credibility" (p. 272). 
Finally, Lather proposes the less established notion of catalytic validity as a 
radical strategy for effecting what Freire refers to as "conscientisation". That is, 
catalytic validity is a measure of the degree to which the research process "reorients, 
focuses, and energises participants toward knowing reality in order to transform it" 
(p. 272). As Lather points out, this category of validity, underpinned as it is by a 
conception of knowledge production as inextricably linked with issues of power, 
completely contradicts the positivist notion of researcher neutrality. 
Lather's focus on the problem of validity reflects her concern that research 
aimed at addressing social inequalities and at producing social change must address 
issues of empirical accountability as well as issues of social relevance. While 
praxis-oriented research has dismissed positivist attempts to produce value-free 
knowledge as futile and conceptually flawed, for Lather this does not mean also 
discarding methodological rigour. Her notion that openly ideological research can 
be "objectively subjective" by putting in place minimum standards of validity 
captures in a nutshell her vision of research practices in a postpositivist 
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environment. Lather's vision of emancipatory research has undoubted merits but I 
would suggest that the credibility of her postpositivist claims are somewhat 
undermined by a number of contradictions apparent in her work. Lather's concern 
that research should be primarily engaged in empowering oppressed groups rather 
than with fostering the "career advancement of social scientists built on [the 
utilisation ofJ alienating and exploitative [research] methods" (1986a, p. 75) is a 
commendable one. However, her concern with the oppressed is undennined by her 
preoccupation with authorising her own validity claims in relation to producing 
emancipatory forms of knowledge rather than with democratising the research 
process. Indeed, her desire to give praxis-oriented knowledge an aura of legitimacy 
suggests that she still adheres to a hierarchical ordering of knowledge where the 
intellectual armed with the right methodological tools (in this case self-reflexive 
models of validity) is able to produce truly emancipatory knowledge. 
While Lather echoes Rorty in claiming that theory works because it is interesting 
rather than because it is true, her conversion to a postpositivist paradigm is 
unconvincing. I would suggest that despite her replacement of the language of 
positivism with the language of praxis, Lather is still haunted by the positivist 
spectres of objectivity and neutrality. At the same time as she acknowledges the 
subjective and partial nature of all research and the futility of positivist attempts to 
eradicate 'values' from the research process utilising quantitative models, she calls 
for praxis-oriented researchers to develop systematic methodological strategies in 
order "to protect our work from our passions and limitations [ my emphasis]" 
(1986b, p. 272). Thus, while her redefined notions of validity represent a significant 
attempt to create more emancipatory research practices, it seems that an objectivist 
model of knowledge still lurks beneath Lather's liberatory intentions. 
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Linked with Lather's inability to completely break free from the subject-object 
dichotomy central to the positivist paradigm is her tendency to reify the material 
world as somehow more 'real' and less 'subjective' than theory-building processes. 
Lather tends to merely reverse rather than replace the traditional theory-data 
dichotomy by privileging empirical reality over theoretical abstraction. In doing so, 
she acknowledges the impossibility of "theory-independent facts" (1986a, p. 77). 
However, at the same time, she urges the researcher to attempt to reach an 
empirically pure realm "beyond [theoretical] predisposition" (p. 77). Paradoxically, 
then, it could be argued that her insistence that all knowledge must be 'grounded' to 
be credible reinscribes the transcendent, value-free models of knowledge Lather 
professes to challenge. 
Validity after poststructuralism: Authorising Reflexivity 
As I have pointed out, Lather's earlier work on research as praxis contains some 
useful insights into the liberatory possibilities of alternative research methodologies 
while illustrating some of the theoretical dilemmas facing the feminist materialist 
wanting to engage with critical theory. However, while Lather purports to be 
breaking with traditional empirical concerns, it is apparent in her early work on 
postpositivist forms of validity that she is still concerned with constructing an 
authoritative scientific discourse and with legislating the boundaries of 'rigorous', 
empirical research. 
In her latest article Fertile Obsession: Validity After Poststructuralism, Lather 
(1993) once again claims to "rethink validity", this time in response to the 
challenges of "antifoundationalist discourse theory" (p. 674). In addressing her 
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latest approach to validity I will examine the ways in which she problematises her 
earlier more materialist concerns; concerns that revolved around issues of authority, 
legitimation and the problem of data credibility in emancipatory research. In this 
later article, Lather wholeheartedly embraces the possibilities of poststructuralism, 
replacing the language of materialism with a poststructural rhetoric littered with 
Derridean terms. However, the question remains as to whether this shift in 
terminology represents anything more than a cosmetic change in relation to Lather's 
empirical agenda. 
The occurrence of conferences on the "End of Science" indicates, Lather 
argues, that the general crisis of representation experienced across the disciplines 
has impacted significantly on the field of scientific endeavour highlighting "the 
impossibility of science" (p. 687). Critiques of realism and universalism have 
undermined the scientist's ability to legitimate the validity of his/her work through 
recourse to foundationalist notions of Truth and Reason. Lather sees these critiques 
as opening up a "postpositivist" space for radical scientists to develop new 
methodologies that embrace anti-foundationalism. 
In attempting to formulate alternative approaches to knowledge out of which "a 
different science might take form" (p. 673), Lather's central concern remains with 
the topic of validity. However, while seeking to retain validity as a term, she hopes 
to "both circulate and break with the signs that code it" (p. 674) in a kind of 
Derridean gesture of simultaneous inscription and erasure. Lather wishes to 
"rupture validity as a regime of truth" at the same time as holding onto the tenn as a 
useful "limit question" for research (p. 674). As she points out, the problem of 
validity arises even in research informed by antifoundational discourses where 
debate inevitably occurs over "the importance of appropriate restraints and 
regulations" (p. 674). The important point for Lather is that such disagreement 
cannot be neatly resolved through recourse to some foundational discourse but 
instead must be framed in terms of an open, dialogic approach to questions of 
knowledge. Issues of validity must be debated rather than solved in a prescriptive 
fashion. 
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Despite not wanting to close off the possibility of dialogic negotiations about 
the notion of validity, Lather betrays her theoretical allegiances early on in the piece 
when she admits that, for her, a reconceptualised validity must be grounded in a 
focus on practice. Theory cannot exist in a vacuum but must evolve out of and at 
the s~me time valorise [my emphasis] practice (p. 674). Quoting Marcus and 
Fischer, Lather argues that in an antifoundational era where stable meanings can no 
longer be sought in epistemology, "practice becomes the engine of innovation" (p. 
674). Put another way, the demise ofmetanarratives of certainty means that claims 
to legitimacy devolve to the local level where practice takes precedence over 
foundationalism. 
For Lather, the emergence of postpositivism/postmodemism has been 
accompanied by a radical shift in the way we conceptualise the act of representation 
whereby the world is seen as "constructed" rather than "found" (675). 
Poststructuralist critiques of the notion of the stable referent have foregrounded 
"how discourse worlds the world" (p. 675). The death of the 'real' however does not 
signify the end ofrepresentation. Rather, for Lather, this shift towards viewing the 
world as discursively constructed only serves to underscore Derrida's observation 
regarding "the inescapability of representation" (p. 675). The "crisis of 
representation" thus involves the recognition that the emphasis of representation 
must shift from describing the world in objective tenns to representing the 
discursive complexities of social relations. Rather than looking for meaning in the 
external world we must instead examine "what frames our seeing" (p. 675), that is 
we must aim to make visible the implicit ways in which we construct meaning. 
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With the demise of extradiscursive "epistemological guarantees", validity 
becomes reframed as "multiple, partial, endlessly deferred" (p. 675). Lather admits 
that "various postpositivist efforts" to resolve the problem of validity (for example, 
qualitative practices such as triangulation and catalytic validity) have proved 
inadequate if not irrelevant (p. 675). Lather contends that validity can no longer be 
viewed merely as a problem of methodology that can be solved at a technical level 
but iustead must be viewed, and here she quotes Mishler, as "problematic in a deep 
theoretical sense" (p. 675). 
She concludes that in order to "do" science in a way that does not simply revert 
to a positivist framework "requires the invention of counter discourses/practices of 
legitimation" (p. 676). For Lather, such practices involve interrogating 
representation in a reflexive manner. The researcher must encourage an active 
dialogue between herself and her readers, a dialogue in which the researcher 
discusses and debates the problematics of her particular chosen 
epistemological/methodological framework. Such an approach Lather hopes will 
liberate research from the constraints of positivism, thus enabling us to fonnulate 
new fonns of theory and practice. Lather is advocating a kind of validity founded 
"on a researcher's ability to explore the resources of different contemporary inquiry 
problematics" (p. 676). 
This new fonn of validity revolves around making previously implicit norms of 
legitimation visible. In this way the research process becomes a kind of 
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performance where the theorist/researcher actively stages the "poses of 
methodology" (p. 677). Through a self-conscious revelation of the performative or 
negotiated aspects of the research process, the postmodern scientist thus signals a 
fundamental shift away from viewing research as a process of neutral reflection 
toward an emphasis on meaning and validity as actively produced. 
Lather envisages the possibility of putting into practice a "transgressive" 
validity that produces "counter-practices of authority" while at the same time 
enacting the "crisis of representation"(p. 677). Her hope is that research employing 
strategies of "excess and categorical scandal" will help to guard against merely 
repro_ducing another "regime of truth" (p. 677). Postpositivists who merely invent 
new presciptions for doing valid research are seen as policing disciplinary 
boundaries thereby limiting "the possibilities for a critical social science" (p. 677). 
Instead, Lather aligns herself with the researcher who is genuinely concerned with 
questioning the conventions of disciplinary authority. In order to disrupt the 
legislative practices associated with conventional notions of validity, Lather 
( quoting Werkmeister), offers "a forthrightly personal and deliberately ephemeral 
antithesis" (p. 677). 
In this vein, Lather discusses four "frames" of validity: validity as 
simulacra/ironic validity; Derridean rigour/rhizomatic validity; Lyotardian 
paralogy/neo-pragmatic validity; and voluptuous/situated validity. These four 
"scandalous categories" represent "performances" of a transgressive approach to 
validity (p. 683). Lather pairs each mode of validity with an empirical exemplar as a 
means of illustrating the concrete possibilities of abstract theory. 
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In particular, her appropriation ofLyotard's model of "legitimation by 
paralogy", contains parallels with Clifford's reworking of Bahktin's dialogic 
conception of the novel. Paralogy, in contradistinction to the logic ofrealism, 
derives legitimation from a search for incommensurability. It aims to foster 
heterogeneity and to search for instabilities and tensions rather than consensus thus 
"undermining ... the framework within which previous "normal science" has been 
conducted" (p. 679). Refusing to construct coherent narratives of closure, paralogy 
enacts a disruptive (and here Lather quotes Lyotard) "obligation to complexity" (p. 
679). 
Lather discusses an example of a study looking at African-American women 
and leadership positions in higher education as an example of the paralogic model in 
practice. In this study the researcher uses a number of textual strategies in order to 
problematise her own position as the privileged interpreter. For example, the 
researcher actively sought dialogue and participation from her "informants" by 
sending them draft copies of the research in-process. She then constructed a final 
draft that contained three tales: a realist representation of the research process; a 
critical tale foregrounding her own "theoretical investments" in the type of analysis 
she had chosen; and, finally, a deconstructive tale narrated in the third person that 
draws upon the critical voices of the research participants. In this final section the 
researcher openly discusses her own hegemonic practices in the research process as 
a white middle class feminist who has acted in complicity with a feminism that 
tends to subsume race and difference within the analytic category of gender. 
Lather applauds this open self-scrutiny where the researcher has taken active 
steps "toward unlearning her own privilege and displacing the colonising gaze" (p. 
680). By foregrounding the constructed nature of the research design the researcher 
83 
is displaced from the position of"master of truth and justice", instead enacting "her 
knowledge of language games as she assumes responsibility for the rules and effects 
of her investments" (p. 680). In this case validity is derived from an attempt to de-
authorise knowledge production in order to foster heterogeneity. 
Lather offers these alternative frames of validity, then, not as authoritative 
solutions to problems of legitimacy but as a means of acting out the "crisis of 
authority that has occurred across knowledge systems" (p. 683). For Lather, the 
possibilities opened up by this moment of crisis suggest "what was impossible under 
traditional regimes of truth in the social sciences: a deconstructive problematic that 
aims µot to govern a practice but to theorise it, deprive it of its innocence [ and to] 
pose as a problem what has been offered as a solution" (p. 683). The object of 
science in the era of post-positivism thus shifts from a focus on "truth" to an 
examination of"the constitution and annulment of its own text" (p. 683). 
From Research as Praxis to the Impossibility of Science 
As I have demonstrated, Lather's earlier work is primarily concerned with the 
intersection between political praxis and social inquiry. This involves an apparent 
recognition that knowledge is never neutral but instead is always partial and 
contested. Lather thus seeks to legitimise alternative ways of doing science that run 
counter to the positivist obsession with attaining interest-free knowledge. These 
counter practices involve doing research that openly incorporates its own ideological 
biases into the research process itself. The credibility of the research project is thus 
detennined in part by its socio-political relevance rather than by quantitative 
measures of objectivity. 
84 
However, while the emergence of such experimental research practices seems to 
have indicated that we have entered a postpositivist era, Lather is aware that 
positivism still reigns supreme as the dominant scientific paradigm. She contends, 
then, that political relevance is not enough "if openly ideological research is to be 
accepted as data rather than as metaphor by those who do not share its value 
premises" (1986a, p. 77). She therefore urges praxis-oriented researchers to place as 
much emphasis on rigour as on relevance in order to ensure the credibility of social 
data. At this point, despite her desire to produce a postpositivist science, Lather 
turns to positivistica1ly-based models of validity in order to legitimise her political 
proje~t. While she attempts to "reconceptualise" positivist notions of validity by 
incorporating processes of reciprocity and partiality into the research process, her 
desire to develop "objectively subjective" research reveals an underlying concern 
with producing 'better' models of representation rather than moving beyond the 
positivist project of neutral social description. 
In Lather's latest work on validity I have discussed her attempts to move 
'beyond representation' by pointing out the 'impossibility of science'. Lather's 
( 1993) concern is with exploring the inventive possibilities of the impossible in 
order to ( quoting Rajchman) "inhabit those moments of actuality in which we are 
becoming something else than what out history has constructed us to be, those 
heterotopic moments of our current historical impossibility" (p. 687). Heavily 
influenced by discourse theory, she attempts to work against "the usual couching of 
validity in terms of disciplinary maintenance, disciplining the disciplines" (p. 677) 
by constructing fluid models of validity that mimic positivist concerns in an ironic 
fashion. 
Thus, while previously concerned with authorising praxis-oriented modes of 
research it seems that Lather now wishes to transcend such disciplinary practices. 
However, as I suggested earlier, Lather's transition from a feminist materialist 
concerned with legislating the bounds of rigorous praxis-oriented research to a 
poststructuralist concerned with utilising the current crisis of authority in order to 
de-authorise prescriptive paradigms of knowledge is not a completely convincing 
one. 
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Firstly, at the same time as Lather acknowledges the partial and "grounded" 
nature of knowledge, her work is underpinned by a desire to transcend historically 
and discursively situated social meanings in order to enter a realm of "historical 
impossibility" where a space exists ( quoting Derrida) "to say the unsayable ... to see 
the unseeable ... or to represent the unrepresentable" (p. 687). While Lather is critical 
of those postpositivists who merely construct a new 'successor' science replacing 
positivism, her reification of discourse theory and the libratory possibilities of 
language opens her up to a similar charge. Furthermore, the notion that there exists 
some space of impossibility outside of representation available to those theorists 
who embrace certain libratory practices suggests that Lather's brand of 
poststructuralism is still driven by a desire to transcend the constraints of 
authoritative discourses; that is, to access 'interest-free' approaches to knowledge. 
In my concluding chapter I discuss in more detail this paradoxical postmodern 
concern with detachment; an ideal which has been characterised by Susan Bordo 
(1990) as the postmodern "dream of being eve,ywhere" (p. 143). 
Secondly, I would contend that despite Lather's (1993) attempts to generate 
non-legislative "counter~practices of authority" (p. 677), her work on validity is 
founded on a rather prescriptive treatment of reflexivity accompanied by a tendency 
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to privilege "practice" as a source of pure knowledge untainted by theory. Lather 
contends that she wishes to move beyond the kind of disciplinary practices evident 
in her earlier articles where she attempted to set up rather rigid methodological 
guidelines for praxis-oriented researchers. Instead, Lather sees "the most useful 
stories about science [as being] those which interrogate representation" (p. 676) in a 
self-reflexive fashion. While Lather attempts to disguise the authoritative intent of 
her scientific theories by calling them "stories" or by contending that her statements 
about validity are merely ironic, her privileging of issues of representation is far 
from innocent. Instead, this privileging relates to her desire to legitimise a scientific 
discourse ofreflexivity surprisingly similar to the prescriptive fonns of validity 
baseq_ on reciprocity privileged in her earlier work. 
A final point. In critiquing Lather's liberatory claims I am not suggesting that 
her employment of discourse theory has not problematised issues relating to 
representational authority and foundationalism. Instead, my concern revolves 
around Lather's apparent unwillingness to recognise her own 'will to power' in 
wishing to 'liberate' us from the constraints of positivism. Rather than privileging 
discourses of reflexivity, it seems that the lesson that one can take from Lather's 
work is the need to foreground the partial and therefore theoretically limited nature 
of all discourses including poststructuralism. 
V 
CONCLUSION : KNOWLEDGE 
WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS 
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In this thesis I have utilised Bauman' s contention that the interpretive 
intellectual is increasingly becoming a cultural dominant in order to frame my 
discussion. I have examined the work of three theorists who I see as exemplars of 
this emergent phenomenon occurring within the humanities. While the work of the 
theorists on which I have chosen to focus differs in significant ways, the striking 
parallels between their basic epistemological (or perhaps, more correctly, anti-
epistemological) concerns do indeed support Bauman's assertion that we have 
witnessed a major shift towards a new approach to theories of knowledge. 
H;owever, while Bauman's legislative/interpretive model has proved a useful 
cognitive frame through which to view the anti-legislative stance taken by these 
theorists in their pragmatically oriented work, I want to turn this debate about 
knowledge away from Bauman's thesis to a focus on what I see as primarily a shift 
towards anti-foundationalism. This may seem on the surface to be a rather subtle 
change in focus given that Bauman's notion of the interpretive intellectual seems to 
overlap considerably with the goals and ideals of anti-foundationalism. However, 
my desire to shift the focus away from Bauman's legislative/interpretive dichotomy, 
stems from the difficulties I perceive to be inherent in such an oppositional 
construction of intellectualism, and in its implications in terms of the relations 
between power and knowledge. 
As I have analysed the various models of knowledge offered by Rorty, Clifford 
and Lather, it has become apparent that the notion that the intellectual can somehow 
escape legislative or legitimatory concerns is a problematic and misleading one. As 
I have indicated in my reading of Lather's work for example, while the intellectual 
may make a conscious attempt to move beyond legislative concerns it is not possible 
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to operate outside of a wider context of social and power relations. The notion of 
anti-foundationalism, then, captures the spirit of an intellectual movement 
concerned with dethroning foundational approaches to knowledge and disrupting the 
modem faith in myths of certainty. At the same time it allows for and acknowledges 
the legislative and repressive possibilities of such an apparently liberatory 
movement. 
In focusing on various strategies employed by theorists in response to the 
current crisis of intellectual authority, I have tried to capture the complex and often 
contradictory nature of anti-foundationalism's liberatory claims. Bauman's 
discussion of the legislative intellectual draws attention to the obvious tension 
between liberatory social movements concerned with the affirmation of difference 
and a modem tradition underpinned by discourses of order and certainty. However, 
what I have sought to emphasise is the equally problematic relationship between 
such liberatory movements and the supposed emancipatory discourse of anti-
foundationalism or postmodemism. In order to further clarify this problematic I will 
briefly summarise the main points of anti-foundationalism. I will then introduce 
Foucault's conception of knowledge into the discussion in order to underscore the 
ambiguity of the anti-foundationalist position in relation to discourses of 
emancipation. 
While the three theorists discussed in this thesis hail from very different 
disciplinary and critical positions, as anti-foundationalists they are unified in their 
critique of the politically oppressive effects of epistemology. For these theorists, the 
notion of epistemology is problematic because it presumes that the intellectual can 
comprehend all social objects from "a God's eye rationalist perspective" (Lather, 
1989, p. 6). As anti-legislative theorists, they are critical of the kind of intellectual 
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who uses epistemology or 'grand' theory in order to claim for themselves a unique 
status as controllers and generators of knowledge. Epistemology, they argue, is 
utilised by legislative intellectuals in order to defend themselves against the 
contingency of knowledge and "to deny or mask their own specific institutional 
limits" (Wickham, 1990, p. 2). In the process of searching for a grand overview of 
the world, these totalising intellectuals shift the focus away from "specific 
calculations made by definite actors in specific locations" (p. 2) and thereby 
depoliticise/decontextualise the process of knowledge production. 
In contrast, the anti-foundationalist is concerned with privileging models of 
know_ledge that focus on the specific 'pragmatics' of everyday experience. Their 
concern is with promoting multi-perspectival, pluralist approaches to knowledge in 
order to challenge the cultural hegemony of totalising and exclusionary claims to 
universal truth. Anti-foundationa1ism suggests an innate concern with the way in 
which modem intellectualism with its focus on epistemology inevitably excludes 
and represses difference. Both Clifford and Lather profess an interest in the way 
that conventional approaches to representation involve marginalising or silencing 
the voices of the subaltern while Rorty is critical of foundationalist philosophies that 
constrain the possibilities of free and open dialogue. The anti-foundationalist's 
focus on the dominatory tendencies associated with conventional epistemologically-
based approaches to knowledge intersects with Foucault's conception of knowledge. 
However, as we will see, a Foucauldian approach to knowledge paradoxically 
problematises some of the basic premises underpinning anti-foundationalism. 
Foucault, as a major contributor to contemporary conceptualisations of power 
relations, portrays knowledge as being produced within, and as an effect of, 
particular discursive formations; that is, systems of signification or practice. For 
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Foucault, discourse is more than an effect of language. Instead, he sees knowledge 
production as being embedded in everyday social practices and institutions. Like the 
anti-foundationalist, he rejects the modem contention that one truth/reality exists 
outside of discursive relations, accessible to the autonomous intellectual via the 
tools of reason and rationality. Rather, he shows that such modem metanarratives 
are themselves merely discourses or "competing ways of giving meaning to the 
world" (Weedon, 1987, p. 35). Foucault suggests that the totalising theories of the 
Enlightenment attained primacy in Western culture not by providing better or truer 
representations of 'reality' but through suppressing competing forms of knowledge 
or meaning production. 
Like Rorty, Foucault is not interested in testing the veracity of Enlightenment 
claims to truth. Instead, his concern lies with what he calls "regimes of truth", that 
is, he is interested "in seeing historically how effects of truth are produced within 
discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false [ my emphasis]" ( quoted in 
Rabinow, 1986, p. 240). His conception of knowledge proposes that for the modem 
world to maintain its central concern with truth and order, all that threatens to 
challenge this systematised fiction must be silenced or marginalised. Foucault's 
notion of competing knowledge claims seems to complement an anti-foundationalist 
emancipatory project concerned with creating a space in which the multiple voices 
of the 'other' might be heard. 
However, the corollary of Foucault's analysis is that all knowledge claims, not 
just claims to truth, must be seen to be embedded in power relations and social 
practices. If such a conception of knowledge is accepted then ostensibly liberatory 
discourses, such as those associated with anti-foundationalism, become implicated 
in the very repressive and disciplinary mechanisms they seek to deconstruct. 
Foucauldian theory suggests that anti-foundational discourses of uncertainty and 
indeterminacy are far from innocent stories written in order to liberate the 'other' 
from legislative modern discourses. Thus, such 'interpretive' discourses represent 
more than just alternative conceptions of knowledge. Rather, like modern regimes 
of truth, anti-foundationalism is inevitably constituted by, and at the same time 
constituting of, a wider network of power relations. 
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In relation to modem metanarratives of truth, Foucault points out that such 
regimes are "not merely ideological or superstructural [but instead represent] a 
condition of the formation and development of capitalism" ( quoted in Rabinow, 
1986~ p. 240). Here I would like to suggest that if we are to contextualise anti-
foundationalism in terms of social practices then it is important to acknowledge its 
role in relation to late capitalism. As I outlined briefly in chapter one, a number of 
theorists including Jameson and Zavarzadeh, have suggested that the anti-
foundationalist's celebration of difference may be determined more by the cultural 
logic oflate capitalism than by a radical project of emancipation. It seems, then, 
that calls to abandon totalising narratives on the grounds of encouraging more 
liberatory, pluralist approaches to representation must be examined more closely in 
terms of the conservative possibilities of such an anti-foundationalist move. 
Embracing Ambivalence: T~e New Regime of Difference 
Susan Bordo (1990), in writing about some of the problems facing feminists 
who engage in a "programmatic appropriation of poststructuralist insight" (p. 136) is 
critical of what she sees as the conservative possibilities of anti-foundationalism. 
Bordo perceives postmodernism as having contributed to feminist theory in a 
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number of important ways. For example, postmodern theory has provided feminism 
with "the invaluable insight that gender forms only one axis of a complex, . 
heterogeneous construction, constantly interpenetrating ... with multiple other axes of 
identity" (p. 139). However, Bordo is critical of the tendency to convert "this 
insight into the authoritative insight" (p. 139). She voices concern about the 
legislative bent associated with a "dogma that [insists that] the only 'correct' 
perspective on race, class and gender is the affinnation of difference" (p. 139). 
For Bordo, this postmodern preoccupation with celebrating difference for the 
sake of difference is underpinned by a utopian ideal of disembodied knowledge: "a 
drea~ of being everywhere" (p. 143). While the anti-foundationalist is critical of 
the modern intellectual's endless search for an authoritative Archimedean viewpoint 
outside of the influence of history and culture, Bordo contends that 
postmodernism/anti-foundationalism, with its focus on "ceaseless textual play ... may 
slip into its own fantasy of escape from human locateness-by supposing that the 
critic can become wholly protean by adopting endlessly shifting, seemingly 
inexhaustible vantage points, none of which are 'owned' by either the critic or the 
author of a text under examination" (p. 142). Her point is that theorists who 
celebrate the possibilities of "narrative heteroglossia" and "epistemological 
jouissance" run the risk of obscuring "the located, limited, inescapably partial, and 
always personally invested nature of human 'story making"' (p. 144). 
Bordo argues that the project of embracing heterogeneity must involve an 
acknowledgment of the impossibility of actually achieving multiplicity. She 
contends that an appreciation of difference depends on the recognition that there are 
limits and boundaries that constrain us. Without the recognition of such limits the 
notion of difference itself fades away into sameness. By effacing these limits, the 
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postmodernist demonstrates "a resistance to the recognition that one is always 
somewhere, and limited" (p. 145). Bordo points out that in order to overcome the 
Cartesian preoccupation with transcendence, the postmodernist needs to do more 
than merely replace "metaphors of spectatorship" with discourses of heteroglossia 
(p. 145). Instead, she urges postmodernism "to relinquish all fantasies of 
epistemological conquest, not only those that are soberly fixed on necessity and 
unity but also those that are intoxicated with possibility and plurality[ my emphasis]" 
(p. 145). She concludes, then, that despite the antifoundationalist's explicit 
rejection of a representational model underpinned by a correspondence view of 
reality, the unthinking affirmation of difference "reveals a longing for adequate 
representations-unlike Cartesian conceptions, but no less ambitiously, of a 
relentlessly heterogeneous reality" (p. 14 5). 
Given the conservative implications of what Bordo sees as anti-
foundationalism' s "theoretical deconstruction of locatedness" (p. 145), the question 
remains as to what the concrete political implications of such a theoretical stance 
might entail. Does this apparently liberating critique really free us to "create our 
own individual and collective lives, to articulate our own voices, to diffuse the 
'Other' into just one more other" (Haber, 1994, p. 113)? Like Bordo, the feminist 
theorist Honi Haber has doubts about the possibilities for empowerment offered by a 
post-philosophical model that "insists everywhere on difference and the illegitimacy 
of a subject position" (p. 113). For Haber some kind of "identity fonnation" is 
necessary for "political resistance" (p. 114 ). As she points out, the "demand to 
universalise difference [becomes problematic for a politics of resistance because it 
asks us] to foreclose on the possibility of the subject, be it individual or communal" 
(114). 
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It seems that rather than opening up a conversation between peoples, anti-
foundationalism's refusal to acknowledge generalisable claims of any sort and its 
unthinking obeisance to what Haber terms "the law of difference" (p. 114) actually 
serves to silence those marginalised groups who are attempting to voice their shared 
experiences of oppression for the first time. As within an exclusionary modernist 
paradigm, the anti-foundationalist tends to suppress difference since it is the 
privileged perspective/position of white male philosophers, as the arbiters of what 
constitutes politically correct knowledge/truth, that is being reinforced. Haber's 
highlighting of this legislative aspect of postmodernism strikes a chord with 
Jameson's warning that the politics of pluralism may have more to do with the 
plur11;list logic of capitalism than a politics of empowerment. In this sense, anti-
foundationalism can be interpreted as becoming "the new common sense of liberal 
pedagogy and culture" (Zavarzadeh, 1992, p. 30). As such it offers a framework for 
resolving debates "which arise from the contradictions of daily life under capitalist 
labour relations" (p. 31 ). The 'logic' of anti-foundationalism could be said to appeal 
especially to those social groups acutely aware of the contradictions inherent 
between their professed Leftist politics, on the one hand, and an evident material 
privilege, on the other. 
The Cultural Logic of Liberal Pluralism 
As I pointed out in my discussion of Rorty' s conversational model of 
knowledge, the kind of cultural pluralism advocated by anti-foundationalism 
parallels, in a number of ways, the goals and ideals of political liberalism. However, 
despite his stated allegiance with 'bourgeois liberalism', Rorty denies any attempt at 
legitimating liberalism in a foundational sense. Instead, he advocates an anti-
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foundationalist political stance that moves beyond the bounds of ideology. As 
opposed to a Philosophical liberalism grounded in universalist Kantian ideals, Rorty 
claims his support of liberalism is a purely pragmatic one; "a mere 'contingent' 
historical matter" (Burrows, 1990, p. 325). 
Burrows, a feminist philosopher who sees Rorty' s pragmatism as a 
philosophical apology for liberal conservatism, is sceptical as to whether Rorty's 
anti-foundationalist approach to liberalism can stand up to close scrutiny. For 
Burrows, Rorty's application of contingency, reliant as it is on liberal notions of the 
distanced, detached individual able to make 'free choices', is "reminiscent.. .of 
philosophical defences of liberal pluralism" (p. 326). Thus, she argues that Rorty's 
pragmatism is difficult to distinguish from philosophical liberalism making "his 
desire to do away with ideology" (p. 326) unconvincing. Burrows finally concludes 
that Rorty, despite his claims to the contrary, is still "peddling liberal ideology" (p. 
331). While Rorty professes to have moved beyond 'foundationalism' in the 
modernist sense of the word, it is apparent that his notions of pragmatism, in 
particular, his presumption of a rational autonomous subject are still founded on 
liberal ideals. The point that I am making here is that anti-foundationalism, as 
represented in Rorty's work, tends to conceal rather than explore its own social and 
political affiliations. 
Given this lack of attendance to the possibility of its own repressive and 
exclusionary biases, the radical posturing of anti-foundationalist theory translates 
into a rather conservative political model that is distinctly limited in terms of its 
pluralist promise. As Burrows (1990) points out, from the perspective of the 
politically oppressed individual, the anti-foundationalist's relentless focus on 
heterogeneity in place of systematised accounts of social relations merely serves to 
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obscure rather than demystify such structures of dominance and subordination. 
Rorty's liberal has the luxury of being able to disengage with 'theory' and to ignore 
the relations between knowledge and power precisely because he/she is "already 
part of a dominant status quo" (p. 332) that has no need to defend itself on 
ideological grounds. Furthermore, Burrows contends that the fact that Rorty's 
interpretive intellectual is able to take such a pragmatic position has more to do with 
the "material circumstances of advantage in the historical-economic-political 
situation of the world at large" (p. 332) than with any personal choice the 
intellectual might have in relation to theory or ideology. 
Defusing/Diffusing Difference: Diversity as a Discourse of Conservatism 
Political philosopher, John Gray (1993), in his account of the politics of cultural 
diversity, further confirms the suspicion that anti-foundationalist thought may lead 
to a conservative, rather than a radical, politics of difference. Gray, who identifies 
his political leanings as being towards conservative post-liberalism, is interested in 
investigating which political forms are "best suited to a condition of society marked 
by substantial cultural diversity" (p. 253). Through briefly discussing his critique of 
foundationalist approaches to political theory, I will demonstrate the striking 
similarity between the premises and goals of Gray's political conservatism and the 
pragmatic anti-foundationalism ofRorty's conversational approach to political 
issues. 
Gray argues, like Rorty, that cultural pluralism, defined by Gray as "a diversity 
of possibly inc01mnensurable values and world views[,]. .. ought to be at the top of 
the political agenda of modem states" (p. 253 ). He is critical of modem polities that 
seek to "embody or express the cultural identity of homogeneous moral 
communities" (p. 254). According to Gray, such a political goal is founded upon a 
flawed conception of human identity. While Gray is critical of the notion of the 
centred, humanist subject that underpins "all the dominant forms of liberalism, 
conservatism and socialism" (p. 254), he reserves his most scathing comments for 
the Marxist ideal of a quintessential human subject liberated "from ersatz and 
oppressive cultural identities" (p. 255). Gray interprets Marx's social theories, as 
well as his thoughts on community, as being centrally concerned with eradicating 
the pluralist notion of the subject as an "autonomous individual with access to a 
variety of forms of life and modes of thought" (p. 256). Gray concludes that "the 
elimination of the modem expression of human identity as individuality" (p. 256) 
has always been a central doctrine of Marxist theory. 
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For Gray, the political failures of the Marxian project confinn the inadequacies 
of such an essentialist view of human identity. In contrast to the model of a 
universal and coherent subject, Gray, echoing antifoundationalist notions of the 
subject, posits that "personal identity is not a natural fact but a cultural artefact" (p. 
258). In a postmodern society where "status hierarchies are permeable, roles 
complex and often conflicting and social monitoring of personal behaviour 
intermittent and weak", the liberal conception of the autonomous individual is, more 
or less he argues, an "historical reality"(p. 259). However, like Rorty, Gray does not 
see this fact as confinning the essential truth of liberalism in any foundational sense. 
Rather, Gray's liberal individual is the local and historical "distillation of modem 
experience" (p. 259) rather than the representative of an innate, universal, human 
subjectivity. 
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According to Gray, then, the strength of his own conservative philosophy lies in 
its acceptance of the contingent and conventional nature of identity. This focus on 
"the local character of our experience of individuality" involves dispelling the 
liberal humanist myth of the transcendent sovereign subject "distanced from all 
social convention and heir to no tradition" (p. 259). Thus, Gray is not only critical 
of the kind of dogmatic universalism found in Marxist theories of subjectivity, he 
also seeks to undermine the notions of autonomy and individuality underpinning the 
more traditional liberalism associated with, for example, the writings of J. S. Mills. 
While Millian liberalism promises individual autonomy through a rejection of 
tradition and convention, Gray argues that in practice it represents "a force for 
cultural homogeneity and against diversity, a political tendency for which progress is 
more important than liberty" (p. 260). 
Gray's concern with disrupting traditional liberal tendencies towards cultural 
conformity seems to offer political possibilities to those social movements 
concerned with enabling previously silenced social groups to be heard in political 
debates. However, as Bordo's critique of the postmodern obsession with difference 
highlighted, the anti-foundationalist's conception of pluralism, difference and 
identity may paradoxically work against a politics of emancipation. Gray's 
alternative to the liberal humanist subject embodies the problematic relationship 
between anti-foundationalism and discourses of emancipation. 
For Gray, conservative thought is useful in terms of conceptualising a pluralist 
politics because it points out that individual identities "are constituted and not 
encumbered by the fonns oflife that we inherit" (p. 261 ). However, for Gray 
problems arise when the liberal conservative joins the Leftist communitarian theorist 
in suggesting that "identity is contoured by membership in a single moral 
100 
community and mirrored in the institutions of a single political order" (p. 261 ). 
While Gray applauds conservative attempts to "elevate the particulars of concrete 
practice over the delusive universals of abstract theorising" (p. 262), he is sceptical 
of the utility of the notion of a radically situated self. In contrast, he points out that 
the identity of the modern subject is not defined by membership to one coherent 
community but rather draws upon a "cultural inheritance" that is at once complex 
and contradictory, resulting in an equally complex and plural experience of 
subjectivity (p. 262). For Gray, the attempt to bring certainty into the realm of 
subjectivity is a denial of the "experience of marginality" that he argues is central to 
the modern subject (p. 263). The kind of polity that Gray sees as coexisting best 
with_"the subtle mosaic of traditions which is modern society", is a limited form of 
government that avoids attempting to legislate the bounds of a "seamless 
community" by suppressing cultural diversity (p. 265). 
While Gray's ideals are commendable, they seem to offer little political 
ammunition to the theorist concerned with overturning systematic fonns of 
oppression. Once again his conception of the subject as fluid and unconstrained 
suggests he too is caught up in the postmodern 'dream of everywhere' rather than 
concerned with the material realities of difference and diversity. Those attempting 
to theorise the complex relations between social identity, power and agency would 
no doubt readily agree with Gray's critique of essentialist notions of the self. 
However, the alternative model of subjectivity offered by Gray is, I would argue, 
less convincing. 
Given the parallels between liberal conservatism and anti-foundationalism, it is 
no surprise that emancipatory social movements like feminism suspect that 
postmodern pluralism is simply a replacement for liberal humanism as a new 
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doctrine of oppression. From the perspective of the subaltern, this new doctrine 
serves to eradicate locatedness rather than prevent the suppression of difference. As 
Foucauldian discourse theory indicates, we cannot act extradiscursively. Instead, we 
are always limited by our positionality or perspective within a particular discursive 
field. While anti-foundationalism allows us to see the socially and historically 
constructed nature of difference, such an insight does not eradicate the fact that 
social categories such as gender still locate and limit us in a material sense (Bordo, 
1990, p. 148). Even when we attempt to deconstruct these subject positions we 
cannot avoid the danger of domination or exclusion. As Richard Fox (1991) points 
out in his critique of postmodern ethnography "the modem West [cannot] write off 
its c~lpability in quick-and-dirty confessions: the other constructed in the past 
cannot so easily be disembodied from present global relations" (p. 5). Power 
relations are ever present in the ethnographic process and cannot merely be 
"dispersed" through recourse to the kind of dialogic methodology or textual style 
advocated by Clifford. 
It seems then that the desire for pluralism is a problematic libertarian ideal 
given that it demonstrates little regard for the structural constraints that locate and 
limit us as social subjects. Moreover, the notion of pluralism (or its textual 
equivalent heteroglossia) refuses to recognise the presence of any kind of hierarchy 
of oppression. To paraphrase Di Stefano (1990), such a pluralist approach disallows 
the possibility that some kinds of difference, such as gender, make more of a 
difference than others (p. 78). As Craig Owens (1983) succinctly states, 
"pluralism ... reduces us to being an other among others; it is not a recognition, but a 
reduction of difference to absolute indifference, equivalence, interchangeability" (p. 
58). 
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Given the politically conservative possibilities of anti-foundationalism that I 
have mapped out in this thesis, we are forced to view with some scepticism 
Bauman's suggestion that the interpretive intellectual is solely concerned with 
developing new, anti-legislative approaches to knowledge. 1 I have suggested that 
what is missing from Bauman' s account is an adequate treatment of the complex 
relationship between power and knowledge. If we accept, even to some degree, 
Foucault's contention that all knowledge claims are part of a system of competing 
discourses which "necessarily inflict violence on things, ourselves and other 
persons" (Flax, 1990, p. 236) then the legislative tendencies underpinning not only 
the work of 'foundationalist' theorists but also that of the 'antitheory' community, 
must be acknowledged. While on the surface the shift towards discourses of 
ambivalence and uncertainty appear to provide a much needed anti-legislative 
counterbalance to the modern concern with order and truth, anti-foundationalism too 
can be accused of a kind of legislative logic. The polemical neo-Marxist, Mas'ud 
Zavarzadeh (1992), sums up the conservative consequences of postmodern theory by 
pointing out that "undecidability ... is the regime of signification that legitimates 
(post)colonialism by producing modes of intelligibility that render all forms of 
'certainty' (revolutionary interruption and transformation of the economic world 
order) 'passe"' (p. 43). 
Beyond Certainty/Ambivalence: The Cosmopolitan Intellectual 
1 Here I might be accused ofrepresenting Bauman's argument a little too simplistically given that 
in Modernity and Ambivalence he does acknowledge the conservative possibilites of a market-driven 
postmodern pluralism that reduces the tolerance of difference to indifference. However, the point that 
I am making is that Bauman still suggests that the intellectual can embrace a mode of ambivalence 
autonomous from the legislative desires of the state and the market. 
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In this thesis, I have identified the occurrence of a major shift within the 
humanities in the way that knowledge production is viewed. Such a shift involves a 
major realignment, rather than a dispersal, of intellectual authority. Through 
problematising the act ofrepresentation, postmodern and anti-foundational 
discourses have opened up the possibility of more critical, self-reflexive approaches 
to socio-cultural analysis. At the same time, the anti-legislative alternatives 
proposed by proponents of the 'interpretive' turn appear to be potentially no less 
conservative than their modernist precursors. The task, then, must be to take 
advantage of the space opened up by the current crisis of authority in order to 
construct alternative theories of knowledge that move beyond 
legislative/interpretive, foundational/anti-foundational dichotomies. 
Rabinow (1986), in his writings on modernity and postmodernity in 
anthropology, provides a frame of interpretation that resonates with some of the 
concerns I have raised so far while also suggesting a starting point from which to 
pursue alternative and more radical modes of intellectual authority. He proposes we 
view the 'new' intellectual as a "critical, cosmopolitan" (p. 258). For Rabinow, this 
involves taking up an oppositional stance where "one [is] suspicious of sovereign 
powers, universal truths, overly relativised preciousness, local authenticity, 
moralisms high and low" (p. 258). Central to such a stance is a willingness to open 
oneself up to alternative and incommensurate discourses while at the same time 
recognising ones own "imperial tendencies" (p. 258). 
· Rabinow defines cosmopolitanism as a contemporary condition of existence and 
"an ethos of macro-interdependencies, [that entails] an acute consciousness (often 
forced upon people) of the inescapabilities and particularities of places, characters, 
historical trajectories, and fates" (p. 258). As we have seen, social theorists tend to 
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either reify the local or to construct grand theories of difference that efface the 
specificity of social identity. If we discard any notion of identity then we run the 
risk of reverting to the kind of 'neutral' representations of humanity that 
characterised the modem search for cultural order. The heteroglossic ideals 
discussed in this thesis must be tempered by the realisation that we are not all 
equally placed to engage in dialogic encounters. In the light of this realisation, 
Rorty's presumption that as 'rational' subjects we can reduce debates about 
knowledge down to issues of pragmatism, without acknowledging the presence of 
social constraints, becomes highly problematic. Of course, in holding onto some 
notion of identity and locatedness, no matter how self-conscious, we must guard 
against the tendency to replicate rather than disrupt rationalist, universalist 
discourse. It seems that we can never hope to perfect the balancing act between 
recognising knowledges/identities as inevitably situated and wishing to deconstruct 
and move beyond the situated nature of experience. However, what we can do is 
construct more complex and fluid models of experience that acknowledge the 
"specificity of historical experience[s] and place[s], however complex and 
contestable they might be [ while recognising the] worldwide macro-interdependency 
encompassing any local particularity" (p. 258). 
Expanding on Rabinow' s evocative figure of the cosmopolitan intellectual, I 
would suggest that such an intellectual needs to look to truly plural models of 
representation that refuse to construct totalising overviews of social 'reality', or to 
reify narrow dichotomous categorisations of social experience. The approach I 
would advocate draws upon pragmatism in tenns of displacing notions of truth with 
issues of utility but directs this notion of utility in a more openly politicised 
direction. For me, such a move is closely affiliated with Deuleuze and Foucault's 
notion of "theory as a toolkit" where theory is viewed not as a system but as "an 
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instrument, a logic of the specificity of power relations and the struggles around 
them" (quoted in Clifford, 1983, p. 119). My conception of cosmopolitanism relies, 
then, on a kind of politicised pragmatism where the focus is on the situated nature of 
knowledge and identity in terms of recognising an immediate local set of power 
relations. At the same time such a politicised approach acknowledges Rabinow' s 
more global notion of macro-interdependency. Within such a model the 
cosmopolitan intellectual recognises the socially constructed and historically 
situated nature of categories like legislative/interpretive, certainty/uncertainty, 
foundationalism/anti-foundationalism, and the way that they are implicated and 
interwoven within Foucault's network of knowledge and power relations. The task 
for the self-proclaimed emancipatory intellectual, then, is to both deconstruct such 
dualisms in the hope of exploring alternative conceptions while recognising his/her 
own engagement with hegemonic discourses. 
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